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This dissertation consists of two essays on the effect of the media coverage on 
investors’ responses to earnings-related information. In the first essay, “The Effect of 
Media Coverage on Earnings Expectations”, I examine whether media coverage has a 
direct effect on the information content of earnings and an indirect effect through 
changes in analyst forecast activity. Using a broad range of news events prior to earnings 
announcements, I find that pre-announcement media coverage improves analysts’ 
anticipation of future earnings and stimulates their forecasting activity prior to earnings 
announcements. Moreover, after controlling for analyst forecast activity, I find that 
media coverage helps investors anticipate earnings information and preempts new 
information in earnings announcements. The path analysis and cross-sectional analysis 
further suggest that increased analyst forecast activities serve as a mechanism through 
which pre-announcement media coverage preempts the information content of earnings 
announcements. Overall, my findings highlight the important role of the media as an 
information intermediary in increasing the flow of financial information to capital 
markets prior to earnings announcements.  
In the second essay, “The Role of the Media in the Pricing of Industry-wide 
Earnings Information”, I examine whether and how media coverage affects investors’ 
responses to industry-wide earnings information. While prior research on the role of 
media as an information intermediary focuses on the price discovery of financial 




facilitates intra-industry information transfers and improves investors’ timely responses 
to earning-related information at the industry-level. By analyzing a broad range of 
business news coverage during a fiscal year, I find that media coverage mitigates the 
delayed pricing of industry-wide earnings information. Cross-sectional analyses suggest 
the effect is concentrated either where industry-level news coverage is higher or intra-
industry information transfer is easier. Additionally, industry-level news coverage 
increases stock price synchronicity, consistent with my argument that media coverage 
increases the amount of industry-wide information in prices. Overall, my findings 
highlight the important role that media coverage plays as an information intermediary at 
the industry-level: it efficiently extracts and disseminates common industry news and 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
This dissertation consists of two essays on the effect of the media coverage on 
the flow of firm-specific and industry-wide financial information to capital markets 
before earnings announcements. The overall purpose of this dissertation is to investigate 
whether media coverage affects the pricing of earnings-related information at both the 
firm and industry levels.  
In the first essay, “The Effect of Media Coverage on Earnings Expectations”, I 
examine whether media coverage has a direct effect on the information content of 
earnings and an indirect effect through changes in analyst forecast activity. Using a 
broad range of news events prior to earnings announcements, I find that pre-
announcement media coverage improves analysts’ anticipation of future earnings and 
stimulates their forecasting activity prior to earnings announcements. Moreover, after 
controlling for analyst forecast activity, I find that media coverage helps investors 
anticipate earnings information and preempts new information in earnings 
announcements. The path analysis and cross-sectional analysis further suggest that 
increased analyst forecast activities serve as a mechanism through which pre-
announcement media coverage preempts the information content of earnings 
announcements. Overall, my findings highlight the important role of the media as an 
information intermediary in increasing the flow of financial information to capital 
markets prior to earnings announcements.  




Earnings Information”, I examine whether and how media coverage affects investors’ 
responses to industry-wide earnings information. While prior research on the role of 
media as an information intermediary focuses on the price discovery of financial 
information at the firm-level, I address the question of whether media coverage 
facilitates intra-industry information transfers and improves investors’ timely responses 
to earning-related information at the industry-level. By analyzing a broad range of 
business news coverage during a fiscal year, I find that media coverage mitigates the 
delayed pricing of industry-wide earnings information. Cross-sectional analyses suggest 
the effect is concentrated either where industry-level news coverage is higher or intra-
industry information transfer is easier. Additionally, industry-level news coverage 
increases stock price synchronicity, consistent with my argument that media coverage 
increases the amount of industry-wide information in prices. Overall, my findings 
highlight the important role that media coverage plays as an information intermediary at 
the industry-level: it efficiently extracts and disseminates common industry news and 
acts as a conduit for intra-industry information transfers. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the first 









2. THE EFFECT OF MEDIA COVERAGE ON EARNINGS EXPECTATIONS 
 
2.1. Introduction to Section 2 
Price discovery involves gradual information diffusion and the formation of 
investors’ earnings expectations (Lee 2001; Hong and Stein 1999). The stock market 
anticipates much of the information associated with earnings news prior to the actual 
earnings announcement (Ball and Brown 1968). The media regularly collects and 
disseminates firm-specific news, continually providing market participants with 
information. By making business news more available, pre-announcement media 
coverage lowers market participants’ information acquisition costs (i.e., time and effort), 
hence increasing the amount of information they can assimilate prior to earnings 
announcements. This study investigates whether media coverage affects the pre-
announcement information asymmetry between managers and capital market 
participants and the incremental information content of earnings announcements. 
Specifically, I examine whether media coverage over a long pre-disclosure window 
improves financial analysts’ and investors’ ability to anticipate and understand earnings 
information.1      
Extant studies on the role of media in the context of earnings focus on the 
dissemination of particular disclosures (e.g., management guidance and earnings 
                                                 
1 Another stream of literature on the role of media in capital markets focuses on social media such as 
Twitter and Facebook (Blankespoor et al. 2014; Lee et al. 2015; Bartov et al. 2018). This study focuses on 
the traditional and professional business press because it covers a broader range of economic events and is 
less likely to disseminate misleading and speculative information as compared to those social media 




announcements) and find that media coverage improves the price discovery of the 
disclosed earnings information. (e.g., Twedt 2016; Guest 2017; Blankespoor et al. 2018). 
An unanswered question is whether media coverage affects market participants’ earnings 
expectations and influences price discovery prior to public disclosures. I fill this gap in 
the literature by examining the effect media coverage over a long pre-disclosure window 
on the incremental information content of earnings announcements.2 I argue that an 
additional important role of the media is to develop and publicize information that 
reduces the information gap between managers and investors prior to firm disclosures. 
Media coverage extends beyond broadcasting the firm’s announcements, and includes 
increasing the amount of information assimilated into prices and decreasing the amount 
of news left for managers to disclose. Specifically, I predict that pre-disclosure media 
coverage improves market participants’ anticipation of earnings news and reduces the 
amount of new information at the earnings announcement. This prediction is consistent 
with prior research, which shows that the better investors anticipate earnings news, the 
smaller the surprise in earnings announcements (e.g., Atiase 1985; El-Gazzar 1998; 
Beaver et al. 2018).  
The extent to which media coverage in a long pre-announcement window 
influences the pricing of earnings information, a priori, is unclear. First, while media 
coverage of an event stimulates trading activity in a short horizon, it does not necessarily 
                                                 
2 For example, earnings response coefficient type of tests examines price changes in response to one unit 
of unexpected earnings in disclosures (e.g. Twedt 2016; Guest 2017). I do not estimate the price sensitivity 
to a given amount of news in firm disclosures, instead, I am interested in understanding the effect of media 




improve price efficiency by moving stock prices to their fundamental value in the long 
term. For example, short-horizon traders may focus excessively on short-term or 
sensational information while ignoring information about fundamentals.3 Second, 
alternative information sources such as social media, webcasts, and firm disclosures also 
convey information to market participants, so the long-term efficacy of traditional media 
in the context of earnings might be limited. Furthermore, prior research has mainly 
focused on the dissemination role of media coverage, however, the speed of information 
distribution during the non-announcing period should not affect the magnitude of the 
incremental information arrival at earnings announcement.  
This study investigates both the direct and indirect effects of pre-announcement 
media coverage on investors’ responses, with indirect effect arising through analyst 
forecast activity. First, I examine the effect of pre-announcement media coverage on 
analyst forecasting behavior. Financial analysts obtain information from various sources 
such as earnings announcements, broker-hosted investor conferences, and private 
communication with management (Zhang 2008; Green et al. 2014; Brown et al. 2015). 
The media potentially helps analysts better anticipate information in upcoming earnings 
announcements by broadening their information access and lowering information 
acquisition costs. Therefore, as media coverage increases, analysts would increase the 
                                                 
3 News is short-term in nature. Fenton (2009) describes the contemporary work ethic of media industry as 
“speed it up and spread it thin.” News reports change stock prices and increase trading volume within 
days, minutes, or even seconds after their releases, most likely because of trading by retail investors (von 
Beschwitz et al. 2013; Rogers et al. 2016; Peress 2014). In a theory paper, Froot et al. (1992) show that 
short horizon traders may acquire information unrelated to true asset values, making the market less 




frequency and accuracy of their earnings forecasts, thus obtaining less new information 
from the earnings announcements. On the other hand, media coverage may not improve 
analysts’ understanding of earnings-related information because analysts are 
sophisticated information users and financial experts who are likely to rely primarily on 
their own research.  
Using business press coverage of a broad range of news events from the 
RavenPack Dow Jones database from 2000 to 2016, I find that pre-announcement media 
coverage is positively associated with analysts’ forecast accuracy relative to time-series 
forecasts. Moreover, pre-announcement media coverage is positively associated with 
forecast frequency prior to earnings announcements and negatively associated with 
analyst responsiveness to earning announcements. Collectively, these results suggest that 
analysts benefit from the widely accessible information provided by the pre-
announcement media coverage and produce more valuable earnings forecasts; thus, they 
also obtain less incremental information when the earnings are released. 
Next, I investigate the relationship between media coverage preceding earnings 
announcements and investors’ responses to earnings announcements. Earnings 
summarize a firm’s economic performance over a fiscal period and significantly explain 
firm value (Easton and Harris 1991). The media often screens and collects a wide range 
of news events (e.g., earnings guidance, product releases, and labor issues), and broadly 
distributes them to the markets throughout the year, consequently decreasing the pre-
disclosure information asymmetry between managers and investors. This aids investors 




provided by earnings announcements. To measure the information content of earnings 
announcement, I construct a revaluation index using the relative price movement in the 
announcement versus the non-announcement periods. After controlling for an extensive 
set of controls that account for differences in firm characteristics, I find that media 
coverage during the pre-announcement period is negatively associated with the 
revaluation index. This suggests that pre-disclosure media coverage helps investors 
anticipate earnings information and preempts the information content in earnings 
announcements. This finding is robust to including analyst forecast frequency and 
analyst responsiveness, and to the inclusion of firm fixed effects. 
Finally, I examine whether analyst forecast activity serves as a mechanism 
through which pre-announcement media coverage preempts the information content of 
earnings announcements. Analysts’ forecasts of earnings often serve as a proxy for 
market expectations of earnings (Givoly 1985; Brown et al. 1987). If analyst forecast 
activity helps investors to anticipate earnings, then I expect pre-announcement media 
coverage to have an indirect effect on investors’ responses to earnings announcements 
through increased analyst forecast activity. Using a path analysis design, I find evidence 
that pre-announcement media coverage has both direct and indirect effects on the 
incremental information content of earnings announcements, with the indirect effect 
arising through changes in analyst forecast frequency prior to earnings announcements. 
To corroborate this finding, I further conduct cross-sectional analyses based on 
situations in which the effect of media coverage is likely to vary with analyst forecasts. I 




price revaluation around earnings announcement is stronger when analyst forecasts are 
more frequent or when there is a larger number of analysts covering the firm.  
Given that press coverage is not random, I conduct a number of tests to address 
endogeneity concerns and examine the robustness of my primary results. First, I employ 
firm-fixed effects to control for time-invariant factors that could drive both media 
coverage and market participants’ reactions, and find my results hold consistent. This 
mitigates the concern about spurious correlation due to unobservable firm 
characteristics. Second, I use an instrumental variable (IV) approach, using the lagged 
media coverage as an instrument. A firm’s prior year media coverage is likely to be 
associated with current year media coverage, but it is unlikely to directly affect 
investors’ and analysts’ reactions to a given firm’s earnings announcements due to its 
lagged nature. The results from the IV approach support my main findings. Third, I show 
that my full sample results are robust to using a matched sample based on industry, year, 
size, and firm disclosures. Fourth, I perform within-sample analysis on a group of firms 
experiencing significant changes in media coverage over years, and show consistent 
results. Lastly, I repeat my analyses using a small subsample where there are no SEC 8-
K filings or management guidance issuance. I find consistent evidence that pre-
announcement media coverage is positively associated with analysts’ and investors’ 
anticipation of, and timely response to, earnings-related information. 
In additional analyses, I seek to identify the types of news events that help 
investors and analysts form their earnings expectations. Investors could arguably use 




conditions to improve their earnings expectations. However, given investors’ 
information-processing constraints, it is possible that investors only pay attention to 
news emphasizing earnings numbers. I find that both the earnings-related and non-
earnings-related media coverage help investors anticipate earnings news and preempt the 
information content in earnings announcements. Interestingly, while news stories that 
are not directly related to earnings numbers are positively and significantly associated 
with analysts’ forecast accuracy, news stories emphasizing earnings numbers are not 
significantly associated with analysts’ forecast accuracy. These results suggest that 
analysts and investors gain different information from media coverage when forming 
their earnings expectations.  
This study contributes to the literature on the role of the media as an information 
intermediary in the capital market. The media plays an essential role in shaping a firm’s 
information environment, but the few extant accounting studies on the media examine 
how media coverage increases return responses to specific announcements (e.g., Bushee 
et al. 2010; Drake et al. 2014; Twedt 2016; Ahn et al. 2019). Media coverage in short 
windows around one corporate event does not reflect the full extent of the media’s role 
in shaping a firm’s information environment. This study shows that long-window pre-
announcement media coverage has both a direct effect on the information content of 
earnings and an indirect effect through changes in analyst forecast activity. Furthermore, 
empirical evidence of interactions between the media and other financial intermediaries 
is still relatively undeveloped (Miller and Skinner 2015). I provide evidence of the 




financial analysts. Lastly, Recent reductions in analyst headcount and research budgets 
arising from changes in technology and regulation at major investment banks.4 These 
changes in the sell-side analyst industry raise the question of where investors get 
information to form their earnings expectations. My study provides evidence that the 
business press, as an information intermediary, plays an important role in facilitating 
information diffusion and forming investors’ earnings expectations. 
 
2.2. Literature Review, Motivation and Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1. The Business Press as an Information Intermediary 
It is well-documented that information intermediaries such as financial analysts 
and credit rating agencies, provide important information regarding firms’ future 
prospects to capital markets (e.g., Lys and Sohn 1990; Jorion et al. 2005). Recently, an 
emerging stream of research recognizes the crucial intermediary role that the business 
press plays in capital markets. The business press provides information to capital market 
participants through information creation and dissemination roles (Bushee et al. 2010). 
To investigate the media’s information creation role, Bushman et al. (2017) examine 
private lending syndicates and find the media provides new information to less-informed 
lenders via media sentiment (i.e., the tone of the news). Peress (2008) focuses on the 
information dissemination role by using media coverage as a proxy for investor 
attention. He finds that earnings announcements covered by the media generate stronger 
                                                 





price and trading volume reactions at the announcements. Moreover, Li et al. (2011) 
show that newswire services screen for key information disclosed in SEC filings, 
identify value-relevant information buried in such filings, and offer market-moving news 
alerts. While the SEC filings are publicly available, these news alerts trigger significant 
market reactions. 
Extant studies examining the influence of the media in price formation of 
financial information focus on the news coverage of particular disclosures. For example, 
Twedt (2016) finds that news dissemination, measured by news articles written about the 
guidance on its announcement day, is positively associated with initial price reaction to 
the guidance and the speed with which guidance information is incorporated into price. 
Blankespoor et al. (2018) study the effects of media synthesis and dissemination. They 
find that automated news articles generated within three days of each earnings 
announcement increase both trading volume and liquidity. In a related study, Rogers et 
al. (2016) examine the market effects of media coverage of insider trading filings with 
the SEC. They find a substantial increase in trading volume within the two-minute 
window following media coverage of insider trading filings with the SEC on the Dow 
Jones Newswires.  
Generally, prior literature examining the market response to the disclosed 
financial information concludes that the dissemination of firm-initiated disclosure by the 
business press helps price discovery. My study adds to this line of literature by 
examining a different perspective of media coverage and investigates a different stage of 




this study examines whether pre-announcement media coverage improves capital market 
participants’ earnings expectations, and consequently reduces the amount of news 
contained in the earnings announcement. 
 
2.2.2.  Analysts’ Responses  
As relatively sophisticated users of financial information, sell-side analysts 
gather and evaluate various sources of information and then publish their expectations of 
the firm’s future performance. Kross et al. (1990) provide some early evidence that 
analysts’ information advantage is positively associated with firm coverage in The Wall 
Street Journal Index, using 279 firms from 1973 to 1981. They argue that the amount of 
public information available increases analyst forecast performance. Recently, Bradshaw 
et al. (2017) investigate whether sell-side analysts use information from firm-specific 
print news coverage. They find that the quantity of news coverage of a firm is positively 
associated with subsequent recommendation revisions, and that the usefulness of media 
coverage is driven by the soft information provided by the news.  
Pre-announcement media coverage could affect analysts’ information 
environment as well as their forecasting ability. Lang et al. (2003) document that analyst 
following and forecast accuracy improve as a result of cross–listing in the US, 
suggesting that cross listing increases the amount of information available about a firm, 
which allows analysts to predict earnings more accurately. Lang and Lundholm (1996) 
find that firms with higher-quality disclosures have less dispersed forecasts and smaller 




activities, I posit that pre-announcement media coverage is positively associated with 
analysts’ information advantage and their ability to forecast earnings. Moreover, as 
analysts continuously learn useful information from the media, they will forecast 
earnings more frequently. Similarly, if analysts anticipate more of the earnings 
information prior to earnings announcements, they will gain less new information and be 
less likely to respond to earnings announcements. An alternative possibility is that 
analysts have access to superior information acquisition and processing technology or 
they can rely on their own research; thus, media coverage may not have incremental 
benefits for analysts in their earnings forecast activities.  
Based on the preceding discussion, I state my first set of hypotheses in null 
forms:  
H1: Pre-announcement news coverage is not associated with analysts’ forecast 
accuracy or forecast activity. 
 
2.2.3. Media Coverage and Investors’ Earnings Expectations 
My next hypothesis is related to investors’ responses to earnings-related 
information. A number of studies have documented that information intermediaries such 
as financial analysts play important roles in the pricing of accounting information. For 
example, Zhang (2008) finds that post-earnings-announcement drift is significantly 
lower for firm-quarters in which analysts revise forecasts within two trading days after 
earnings announcements. Additionally, Mohanram (2014) documents that the mispricing 




accruals through cash flow forecasts. However, there is scant research on how the media 
affects investors’ reactions to accounting information. One exception is Drake et al. 
(2014) who find that press coverage over a two-day period starting with an earnings 
announcement mitigates cash flow mispricing but has a negligible effect on accrual 
mispricing. The authors attribute this effect to the media’s information dissemination 
function rather than its role in information creation. In contrast to Drake et al. (2014), 
my study focuses on the impact of pre-disclosure media coverage on investors’ earnings 
expectation formation and the incremental information content of earnings 
announcements.  
The short-term effect of media coverage of specific corporate disclosures 
documented by prior literature is distinct from the effects over long pre-disclosure 
windows. Depending on the underlying relation between media coverage and the market 
responses to the disclosed information, the short-term relation could be consistent with a 
positive, neutral, or negative long-term relation between pre-announcement media 
coverage and the information content of earnings announcements. If media coverage is 
driven by the visibility of the firms (i.e., omitted variables), and media coverage is 
positively correlated with the amount of news contained in corporate disclosures, then 
the information content of earnings announcements may be larger for more visible firms 
with a higher level of media coverage. A second possibility is that the increased investor 
reaction following media coverage is driven by the speed of information transmission, in 
which case the long-window pre-announcement media coverage should not affect the 




earnings information to be fully reflected in all firms’ prices. A third possibility is that 
media coverage improves earnings expectations and reduces the pre-disclosure 
information asymmetry between investors and managers, then the amount of new 
information in earnings (i.e., earnings surprise) will be smaller. 
While earnings announcements reveal significant information about firms’ 
economic conditions and generate significant price movements, the stock market 
anticipates much of the information associated with earnings news prior to the earnings 
announcement (Ball and Brown 1968; Beyer et al. 2010). The greater the pre-disclosure 
information, the smaller the earnings surprises. For example, Atiase (1985) shows that 
the amount of pre-disclosure information production and dissemination increases in firm 
size, hence large firms’ earnings releases contain less “unexpected” information. 
Investors’ reactions at the time of the earnings announcement depend on the pre-
disclosure information asymmetry with managers and on the amount of new information 
in earnings (i.e., earnings surprise).  
The business press collects and highlights newsworthy information about firms 
and widely distributes this information to the public throughout the year, which lowers 
investors’ information acquisition and processing costs and increases the amount of 
information investors can assimilate. As media coverage could increase the diffusion of 
earnings information into stock prices ahead of earnings announcements, the information 
in earnings announcements could be preempted by high media coverage. Accordingly, I 
posit that the availability of relevant financial information due to media coverage 




information prior to earnings announcements, and reduces the incremental information 
provided by public disclosures.5 Formally, I state my second hypotheses in an alternative 
form:  
H2: Pre-announcement news coverage is negatively associated with price 
revaluation during earnings announcements. 
 
2.2.4. The links between pre-announcement media coverage and investors’ 
reactions 
Prior studies show that analysts’ earnings forecasts significantly influence stock 
prices and can serve as a proxy for the market expectation of earnings (Beyer et al. 2010; 
Givoly 1985). Investors’ responses to earnings announcements likely depend on whether 
the pre-announcement media coverage changes financial analysts’ forecasting activities, 
which in turn can affect investors’ anticipation of earnings and preempt the information 
in earnings announcements. While pre-announcement media coverage could directly 
lower investors’ information processing and acquisition costs and improve their earnings 
expectations, as discussed in section 2.3., the pre-announcement media coverage could 
indirectly improve investors’ anticipation of earnings by changing analyst forecast 
activities. Therefore, I conjecture that analyst forecast activity is a mechanism through 
                                                 
5 Chapman (2018) finds that earnings notifications (i.e., short announcements of upcoming earnings 
announcements distributed via newswires) are associated with lower abnormal returns around earnings 
announcements, suggesting that earnings notifications grab investors’ attention prior to earnings 
announcements and attenuate investors’ attention to the earnings announcements. This study examines a 
broad range of media coverage over a long pre-announcement window. While earnings notifications are 
included in my pre-announcement media coverage sample, unlike Chapman (2018), the goal of my study 




which the pre-announcement media coverage preempts the information content in 
earnings announcements. Accordingly, I state my third hypothesis in an alternative form: 
H3: Pre-announcement news coverage indirectly affects price revaluation around 
earnings announcements through changes in analyst forecast activity. 
 
2.3. Research Design 
2.3.1. Financial Analyst Forecasts  
To examine whether pre-announcement media coverage helps financial analysts 
to anticipate future earnings (H1), I test several aspects of analyst forecasts by estimating 
the following equation: 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡 (𝑜𝑟 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑡) =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑉_𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑃_𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡 +
∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +  ∑ 𝛾𝑘 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸 +  𝜀.                                   (2.1) 
The first dependent variable in equation (2.1) is analysts’ relative forecast 
accuracy (ACCURACY). It is defined as the difference between a particular absolute 
consensus forecast error issued during the nonreport period (i.e., the sixty-trading day 
window ending two days prior to the earnings announcement date [-61, -2]) and the 
corresponding absolute time-series forecast error, scaled by stock price at the beginning 
of the fiscal year. This variable captures the value added by financial analysts (Kross et 
al. 1990; Bailey et al. 2003). The second dependent variable in equation (2.1) is analyst 
forecast frequency (FREQ), as measured by the average number of earnings forecasts 
that an analyst made for a particular firm during the nonreport period. This measure 




respond to information are likely to update their forecasts frequently (Jacob et al. 1999). 
The third dependent variable in equation (2.1) is analyst responsiveness to earnings 
announcements (RESP), defined as the number of individual earnings forecasts issued 
within 3 trading days [0, +2] after earnings announcements. This variable captures 
whether analysts are responsive to incremental new information in earnings 
announcements (Zhang 2008).   
The variable of interest is the media coverage that is not directly related to 
analyst forecasts during the nonreport period (COV_NONREP_NA). If media coverage 
helps analysts to better anticipate the information in the coming earnings 
announcements, then media coverage should increase analysts’ forecast accuracy 
relative to time-series earnings forecasts and also increase the value of the forecasts to 
investors. Moreover, if the business press increases analysts’ opportunities to acquire 
information prior earnings announcements, then they should update their forecasts more 
frequently. In this case, I expect β1 to be positive in equation (2.1) when the dependent 
variable is ACCURARY or FREQ. Similarly, they may be less inclined to rely on 
earnings announcements as they contain limited new information (i.e., β1 < 0) when the 
dependent variable is RESP. However, if analysts do not gain incremental benefits from 
media coverage, then β1 will not be significantly different from zero.  
Following prior literature (e.g., Hutton et al. 2012; Hughes et al. 2008), equation 
(2.1) includes a number of controls for a firm’s general information environment that are 
related to analyst forecasts: firm size (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (BM), and leverage 




operations. Firms with low book-to-market ratio tend to have more growth opportunities 
and have greater uncertainty. Leverage is an important determinant of a firm’s 
information environment because of scrutiny and monitoring by debt holders. 
Additionally, I control for a firm’s forecasting difficulty using LOSS and STD_EARN. 
Loss firms are generally associated with high information uncertain, and higher earnings 
volatility (STD_EARN) is generally associated with higher forecasting difficulty. Similar 
to Drake et al. (2014) and Bonsall et al. (2018a), I include the amount of firm-initiated 
material event disclosures (8KS_NONREP), analyst following (LN_ANALYSTS), 
institutional ownership (INSTOWN), an indicator for outstanding credit ratings 
(RATED), the number of employees (EMP), and membership in the S&P 500 (SP500) in 
order to further control for the determinants of media coverage. When the dependent 
variable is RESP, I include two additional variables, COV_EA and LAG, to control for 
media coverage during the earnings announcement window and other information 
available prior to earnings announcements. Lastly, I include year fixed effects and 
industry fixed effects to control for time trends and unobservable industrial variations. I 
use firm-clustered standard errors to account for possible correlation across residuals 
within the same firm. 
 
2.3.2. Investors’ Responses to Earnings Announcements   
To test H2, I estimate the following cross-sectional OLS regression: 
𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑉_𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 




where RI is the absolute value of the three-day excess return during the report period, 
divided by the mean absolute abnormal returns in 20 successive three-day periods in the 
nonreport period. I define the report period as the three-day window around the earnings 
announcement date [-1, +1] and the nonreport period as the sixty-trading day window 
ending two days prior to the earnings announcement date [-61, -2]. RI controls for 
nonreport period information and measures the absolute market reactions around 
earnings announcements. Therefore, this variable captures the new information 
conveyed by the earnings release relative to the information that was available during the 
estimation period.6   
My variable of interest is COV_NONREP (i.e., nonreport period media 
coverage).7 If pre-announcement media coverage helps investors better anticipate 
earnings-related information, then investors would be less “surprised” by earnings 
announcements, that is, β1 < 0. I control for analyst forecast frequency (RREQ), analyst 
responsiveness (RESP), and media coverage around earning announcement (COV_EA). 
Following prior literature (e.g., Atiase et al. 1989; El-Gazzar 1998; Beaver et al. 2018), I 
                                                 
6 Because the study is mainly concerned with the magnitude rather than the direction of price reactions, I 
follow prior literature (e.g., Atiase et al. 1989; El-Gazzar 1998; Roychowdhury and Sletten 2012) in using 
the revaluation index, which is based on the absolute value of unexpected returns, abstracting from the 
sign of the unexpected returns. Later, I use squared residual returns similar to Landsman et al. (2012), for a 
robustness check. Also, I use a random three-day window return as the scalar similar to Roychowdhury 
and Sletten (2012), to alleviate the concern about a potential mechanical relation between RI and 
COV_NONREP.  
7 Throughout my analyses, I use media coverage calculated as the natural logarithm of 1 plus the total 
number of articles (Bushee et al. 2010). My results are robust to using the raw number of articles in the 
media. Additionally, I repeat my main analyses using a firm’s abnormal media coverage, which is defined 
as the difference between a firm’s total number of articles reported and its industry average total number 





include several factors related to the firm’s earnings-related information environment: 
firm size (SIZE), reporting timeliness (LAG), analyst following (LN_ANALYSTS), 
institutional holdings (INSTOWN), and an indicator for loss (LOSS). I also two dummy 
variables for both standalone management guidance and management guidance bundled 
with earnings announcements (MF_ALONE and MF_BUNDLE, respectively). Lastly, I 
control for firm-initiated material event disclosures (8KS_NONREP), an indicator for 
outstanding credit ratings (RATED), the number of employees (EMP), and membership 
in the S&P 500 (SP500), and fixed effects. 
 
2.3.3.  The Indirect Effect of Analyst Forecasts on Investors’ Reactions 
To test my H3, I use a structural equation model (SEM) to simultaneously 
examine the relations and paths among pre-announcement media coverage, analyst 
forecast activity, and price revaluation around earnings announcements.8 SEM allows 
me to examine the relative strength of the direct paths of pre-announcement media 
coverage affecting analyst forecasting activity (H1) and the information content of 
earnings announcement (H2), as well as the indirect path of analyst forecasting activity 
affecting the information content of earnings announcement (H3). I use analysts’ 
forecast frequency (FREQ) as a proxy for their forecasting activity. Following prior 
                                                 
8 The path analysis embedded in a structural equation model (SEM) allows estimations of multiple 
relationships simultaneously to examine direct and indirect effects. SEM includes measurement models 
that account for the measurement error in the latent variables, and path analysis models that allow for the 
examination of relationships among multiple dependent variables (Kline, 2015). Path analysis within SEM 
has been recently used in the accounting research to examine direct and indirect effects while taking into 
account measurement errors in both dependent and independent variables (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2012; 




studies that use path analysis (e.g., Landsman et al. 2012; Mattei and Platikanova 2017), 
to decompose the relation between media coverage and price revaluation into a direct 
path and indirect path, I estimate the following model: 
𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑉_𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡  +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +  ∑ 𝛾𝑘 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 +
∑ 𝛾𝑘 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸 +  𝜀,                                               (2.3a) 
𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐶𝑂𝑉_𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + ∑ 𝛼𝑘 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 
∑ 𝛼𝑘 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸 +  𝜀.         (2.3b) 
In this estimation system, the path coefficient β1 is the magnitude of the direct 
path from media coverage to investors’ responses to earnings announcement. The path 
coefficient γ1 × α1 is the magnitude of indirect path from media coverage to investors’ 
responses to earnings announcement through analyst forecast frequency. I use the same 
control variables in equation (2.1) and equation (2.2). Year and industry fixed effects are 
also included in the estimation. 
To provide complementary evidence, I then test the cross-sectional variation in 
the effect of COV_NONREP on RI, using the following regression:  
𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑉_𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾_𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡 (𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾_𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡) +
𝛽3𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾_𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡 (𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾_𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡) × 𝐶𝑂𝑉_𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +
 ∑ 𝛾𝑘 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸 +  𝜀.      (2.4) 
Equation (2.4) introduces indicator variables for the number of analysts 
following the firm or the level of analyst forecast activity (RANK_ANALYSTS and 
RANK_FREQ), which are the tercile rank of analyst forecast frequency (FREQ) and the 




following the firm (LN_ANALYSTS) to capture a firm’s overall exposure to analyst 
forecast information, and the number of earnings forecasts issued (FREQ) to capture 
analysts’ responsiveness to information. A significant and negative coefficient on the 
interaction term, β3, would suggest that the preempting effect of pre-announcement 
media coverage on the incremental information content of earnings announcements is 
more pronounced when analyst forecasts provide more information. 
 
2.4. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics  
2.4.1. Sample Selection  
I begin my sample selection with the universe of firms listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ markets, with December 31 fiscal year ends and with non-penny 
common stocks (i.e., stocks with price-per-share of less than $1.00 at the fiscal year end) 
from 2000 to 2016.9 I obtain financial data from COMPUSTAT, stock price data from 
CRSP, financial analyst data and management guidance data from I/B/E/S, and 
institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuters. I eliminate financial institutions 
(two-digit GICS code = 40); require each six-digit GICS industry in a year to have at 
least 4 firms; and require non-missing data for key variables. I use the Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS) as my industry classification scheme because it is 
consistent from year to year and provides a better grouping of firms for capital market-
based research (Bhojraj et al. 2003; Hui et al 2016). The final sample contains 26,984 
                                                 
9 I limit my sample to firms with a December 31 fiscal year-end because prior research finds that non-




firm-year observations. Table E-1 of Appendix E outlines the sample selection process. 
I obtain news coverage data from the RavenPack Dow Jones Edition 4.0 dataset 
of real-time news coverage from 2000 to 2016. RavenPack provides data analytics for all 
news items disseminated via the Dow Jones Newswire service, which includes Dow 
Jones Newswires, the Wall Street Journal, Barron’s, and MarketWatch. RavenPack 
classifies a news article into news event categories (such as earnings, product releases, 
and business contracts, etc.) and also assigns a relevance score between 0 and 100 to 
indicate how strongly the firm is related to the associated news story.10, 11 Following 
Weller (2018), I exclude news events on trading or prices (i.e., technical analysis signals, 
stock price movements, order imbalance reports) and announcements of future 
disclosure dates (investor relations items). I merge the RavenPack database with 
COMPUSTAT/CRSP data using RavenPack’s ISIN (or CUSIP) firm identifiers. 
Appendix B summarizes the types of news events that comprise my media coverage 
sample. The two most common news types are earnings-related and insider trading-
related news.12 
                                                 
10 The Dow Jones Edition of RavenPack is commonly used in prior research that investigates the role of 
media (Drake et al. 2014; Twedt 2016; Bonsall et al. 2018a; Rogers et al. 2016). Bonsall et al. (2018a) 
show that pairwise correlations between RavenPack Dow Jones news coverage and RavenPack web 
edition news coverage (including a more comprehensive news sources such as Bloomberg, NBC, Yahoo!, 
etc.) exceed 90%. However, I acknowledge that the data is limited to national coverage through the Dow 
Jones news group. Therefore, my sample represents a lower bound for the total amount of information 
produced and disseminated by the media.  
11 If a company is mentioned in the news article but plays an unimportant role, it gets a low relevance 
score. For example, in the story “Moody's Assigns Freescale Ba3 Rating” on 11/03/2006, Freescale 
receives a relevance score of 100, while Moody’s (the rater) receives a relevance score of 20. All news 
reports with an event category assigned to it have a relevance score of 100, which ensures that the article is 
primarily about the firm in question.  
12 The distribution of news event types is similar to that in a recent RavenPack research report (Hafez and 




I summarize the distribution of the sample across years and industries in Table E-
2 and Table E-3, respectively, of Appendix E. Table E-2 shows that my sample is fairly 
evenly distributed across years. Table E-3 shows that software, pharmaceuticals, and 
energy are the largest industry groups in my sample, together representing about 30% of 
the sample. This proportion is very similar to that of the Compustat population. 
 
2.4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics on the main variables in my 
analyses. Log-transformed nonreport period media coverage, COV_NONREP, has a 
mean value of 2.23, meaning that the average number of news reports that firms in my 
sample have during the non-report period is 14.64. After excluding the news articles 
directly related to analyst forecasts, the mean of log-transformed nonreport period 
media, COV_NONREP_NA, is 2.16. On average, analysts issue 5.58 and 4.61 earnings 
forecasts during the nonreport and event periods, respectively. Sample firms are covered 
by 11 analysts on average. 27.3% of firms in our sample experience a loss in a particular 
year. Additionally, both the mean value and median value of revaluation index (RI) are 
greater than 1, suggesting that the new information conveyed by the earnings release is 
greater than the information available during the nonreport period. To reduce the 
possibility that my inferences are influenced by extreme observations, I winsorize all 
                                                 
(ownership form) is the most frequent SEC filing type and SEC filings are important news sources for the 
media. For example, from June 25, 2014 to October 15, 2014, 52% of SEC filings were Form 4 filings 




continuous variables (except for stock returns) at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their 
distributions. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
Panel B of Table 2.1 reports the time trends of the revaluation index (RI), market 
value (MVE), and the number of news articles during the nonreport period. The 
information content of earnings announcements (RI) has a positive time trend, with a dip 
in 2007 and 2008.13 This table also shows that media coverage in recent years is much 
higher than in earlier years, indicating that it is necessary to control for year fixed effects 
in my analyses. Panel C of Table 2.1 provides pairwise correlations among the main 
variables used in my analyses. As expected, media coverage is positively correlated with 
firm size (SIZE), analyst following (LN_ANALYST), and institutional ownership 
(INSTOWN). 
  
                                                 
13 The time trend is consistent with the findings in Beaver et al. (2018). They also document an overall 
increase in information content at earnings announcements over the past decade and a decline at the time 




Table 2.1 Summary statistics  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable N MEAN STD P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 
COUNT_NONREP_NA       26,984  13.779 17.064 0 4 9 18 31 
COV_NONREP_NA       26,984  2.161 1.118 0 1.609 2.303 2.944 3.466 
COUNT_NONREP       26,984  14.641 17.561 0 4 10 19 33 
COV_NONREP       26,984  2.233 1.109 0 1.609 2.398 2.996 3.526 
COUNT_EA       26,984  7.423 5.749 2 4 6 9 14 
COV_EA       26,984  1.893 0.760 1.099 1.609 1.946 2.303 2.708 
ACCURACY       21,249  0.020 0.094 -0.006 0.000 0.004 0.016 0.054 
FREQ       26,984  5.576 9.013 0 1.000 2.000 6.000 14.000 
RESP       26,984  4.606 5.314 0 1 3 7 12 
RI       26,984  2.199 2.142 0.265 0.679 1.555 2.986 4.988 
RI_U       25,261  4.608 7.740 0.259 0.691 1.850 4.828 11.692 
RI_RAND       26,984  8.255 23.916 0.274 0.751 2.008 5.521 15.328 
SIZE       26,984  6.979 1.714 4.800 5.770 6.905 8.082 9.277 
BM       26,984  0.494 0.386 0.119 0.242 0.420 0.649 0.944 
LOSS       26,984  0.273 0.446 0 0 0 1 1 
LEV       26,984  0.247 0.227 0 0.032 0.224 0.385 0.535 
STD_EARN       26,984  0.058 0.097 0.004 0.012 0.027 0.063 0.136 
ANALYSTS       26,984  11.137 8.913 2 5 9 15 23 
LN_ANALYSTS       26,984  2.232 0.749 1.099 1.792 2.303 2.773 3.178 
INSTOWN       26,984  0.588 0.308 0 0.373 0.666 0.838 0.944 
8KS_NONREP       26,984  1.947 2.122 0 0 1 3 5 
EMP       26,984  11.141 35.433 0.116 0.423 1.876 7.799 25 
SP500       26,984  0.171 0.376 0 0 0 0 1 
RATED       26,984  0.302 0.459 0 0 0 1 1 
LAG       26,984  45.617 15.164 26 33 45 56 67 
MF_ALONE       26,984  0.361 0.480 0 0 0 1 1 






Table 2.1 (Continued) 
Panel B: Time Trends 
  Revaluation Index Market value 
Number of news articles  
during nonreport period 
  (RI) (MVE) (COUNT_NONREP) 
Year Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. 
2000 1.151 0.026 3911.791 305.154 4.999 0.232 
2001 1.521 0.037 3494.524 278.734 7.853 0.335 
2002 1.662 0.042 2956.207 235.186 8.370 0.312 
2003 2.054 0.050 3768.680 274.559 10.433 0.353 
2004 2.174 0.051 4116.952 274.493 18.676 0.523 
2005 2.382 0.053 4309.255 285.897 16.456 0.550 
2006 2.387 0.057 4596.398 295.551 20.113 0.574 
2007 2.204 0.050 4666.852 279.830 17.831 0.479 
2008 1.863 0.042 3189.931 229.274 13.502 0.355 
2009 2.151 0.051 4013.454 256.159 16.055 0.464 
2010 2.490 0.060 4797.050 290.482 17.984 0.515 
2011 2.166 0.051 4925.415 317.879 16.015 0.436 
2012 2.450 0.057 5533.971 347.116 17.551 0.473 
2013 2.731 0.066 7311.759 450.697 15.246 0.398 
2014 2.447 0.057 7557.782 443.544 16.072 0.369 
2015 2.655 0.059 6937.112 436.910 14.573 0.353 
2016 2.604 0.061 7629.450 469.317 14.893 0.368 





Table 2.1 (Continued) 
Panel C: Pairwise Correlations (asterisks indicate significant at 1% level) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) ACCURACY 1           
(2) FREQ 0.0622* 1          
(3) RESP -0.0088 0.4894* 1         
(4) RI -0.0248* -0.0493* 0.1403* 1        
(5) COV_NONREP -0.0113 0.2865* 0.3179* 0.0401* 1       
(6) COV_EA 0.0221* 0.2086* 0.3048* 0.1116* 0.6364* 1      
(7) COV_NONREP_NA -0.0130 0.2663* 0.3000* 0.0440* 0.9910* 0.6167* 1     
(8) SIZE -0.0912* 0.4893* 0.5250* 0.0533* 0.4548* 0.3837* 0.4357* 1    
(9) BM 0.2440* -0.0345* -0.1926* -0.0688* -0.1716* -0.0975* -0.1665* -0.2983* 1   
(10) LOSS 0.1560* -0.0871* -0.0801* -0.0752* -0.0981* -0.1305* -0.0920* -0.3375* 0.0868* 1  
(11) LEV 0.0395* 0.0602* -0.0325* -0.0582* 0.0746* 0.0388* 0.0694* 0.1975* -0.0705* -0.0330* 1 
(12) STD_EARN 0.1268* -0.0627* -0.0419* -0.0239* -0.0877* -0.0894* -0.0818* -0.2414* -0.0788* 0.3221* -0.1099* 
(13) LN_ANALYSTS 0.0204* 0.5725* 0.6873* 0.0638* 0.3895* 0.3514* 0.3593* 0.7127* -0.1855* -0.1344* 0.0799* 
(14) INSTOWN 0.0191* 0.1359* 0.2264* 0.1102* 0.3191* 0.3079* 0.3048* 0.2941* -0.0883* -0.1571* 0.0297* 
(15) 8KS_NONREP -0.0045 0.1775* 0.0625* -0.0416* 0.2939* 0.0835* 0.3025* 0.1567* -0.0364* 0.0127 0.1224* 
(16) LAG -0.0053 -0.2880* -0.3110* -0.0229* -0.1871* -0.2091* -0.1717* -0.4436* 0.1090* 0.1989* 0.0418* 
(17) MF_ALONE -0.0215* 0.0047 0.1155* 0.0714* 0.1805* 0.2333* 0.1786* 0.2477* -0.0683* -0.2396* 0.0014 
(18) MF_BUNDLE -0.0427* -0.0058 0.1443* 0.0982* 0.1727* 0.2570* 0.1718* 0.2532* -0.0989* -0.2248* 0.003 
(19) EMP -0.0025 0.1982* 0.2384* 0.0202* 0.2108* 0.2230* 0.2100* 0.3841* -0.0465* -0.1225* 0.0438* 
(20) SP500 -0.0143 0.4253* 0.3918* -0.0036 0.3061* 0.3336* 0.2975* 0.6487* -0.1008* -0.1806* 0.0798* 
(21) RATED 0.0617* 0.2337* 0.1028* -0.0513* 0.1951* 0.1961* 0.1833* 0.4042* 0.0525* -0.1579* 0.2993* 
             
                         
    (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21)  
(12) STD_EARN 1           
(13) LN_ANALYSTS -0.1073* 1          
(14) INSTOWN -0.0973* 0.3064* 1         
(15) 8KS_NONREP -0.0095 0.1264* 0.0914* 1        
(16) EMP 0.0636* -0.3925* -0.1846* 0.0476* 1       
(17) SP500 -0.1425* 0.2204* 0.1651* 0.0168* -0.1757* 1      
(18) RATED -0.1366* 0.2112* 0.1728* 0.0135 -0.1551* 0.7264* 1     
(19) LAG -0.0902* 0.2663* 0.0597* 0.0479* -0.2112* 0.1513* 0.1415* 1    
(20) MF_ALONE -0.1191* 0.4843* 0.1340* 0.0926* -0.3391* 0.2066* 0.1997* 0.3773* 1   
(21) MF_BUNDLE -0.1437* 0.2953* 0.1016* 0.1203* -0.2337* 0.1552* 0.1350* 0.1885* 0.3705* 1  
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2.5. Main Empirical Results   
2.5.1. Analysts’ Responses to Pre-announcement Media Coverage  
Table 2.2 examines the relation between analyst forecast characteristics and the 
intensity of pre-announcement media coverage and reports the regression results of 
equation (2.1). In column (1), the coefficient on pre-announcement media coverage 
(COV_NONREP_NA) is positive and significant (β = 0.003, p-value < 0.01), suggesting 
that analysts’ forecasts are more accurate than time-series earnings forecasts, hence are 
more valuable to investors, when pre-announcement media coverage is higher. In 
column (2), the coefficient on pre-announcement media coverage is positive and 
significant (β = 0.435, p-value < 0.01), providing evidence that analysts’ forecast 
frequency is increasing in news coverage during the nonreport period. In column (3), the 
coefficient on pre-announcement media coverage is negative and significant (β = -0.105, 
p-value < 0.05), suggesting that analysts are less responsive to earnings announcements 
when the firm has greater news coverage prior to earnings announcements. In columns 
(4) – (6), I include firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant firm factors that can 
influence the intensity of media coverage. All my results hold. This suggests that the 
relation between pre-announcement media coverage and analyst forecast activities is not 
driven by unobserved time-invariant firm heterogeneity.  
Taken together, the results in Table 2.2 indicate that pre-announcement news 
coverage improves analysts’ earnings expectations and stimulates analyst forecast 
activity prior to earnings announcements, supporting my prediction in H1. In other 






Table 2.2 The Effect of Pre-announcement Media Coverage on Analyst forecasts 
(H1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ACCURACY FREQ RESP ACCURACY FREQ RESP 
        
COV_NONREP_NA 0.003*** 0.435*** -0.105** 0.002*** 0.403*** -0.158*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.037) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE -0.002** 0.519*** 0.454*** -0.014*** 0.698*** 0.584*** 
 (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BM 0.051*** 1.438*** 0.133 0.054*** 1.101*** 0.368*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.176) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LOSS 0.027*** 0.282* -0.031 0.038*** 0.236** -0.099 
 (0.000) (0.057) (0.679) (0.000) (0.030) (0.101) 
LEV 0.028*** -1.741*** -0.141 0.027*** 0.901*** 0.574*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.435) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
STD_EARN 0.134*** 2.584*** -0.581** 0.149*** 0.039 -0.584* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.043) (0.000) (0.928) (0.056) 
LN_ANALYSTS 0.012*** 4.291*** -0.447*** 0.006 3.674*** -0.317** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.166) (0.000) (0.028) 
INSTOWN 0.010*** -0.180 3.781*** 0.010*** -1.029*** 2.952*** 
 (0.000) (0.578) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
8KS_NONREP -0.000 0.245*** -0.049** 0.000 0.285*** -0.040*** 
 (0.508) (0.000) (0.011) (0.800) (0.000) (0.002) 
EMP -0.000 0.004 0.003 -0.000 0.014** 0.015*** 
 (0.531) (0.281) (0.134) (0.142) (0.036) (0.000) 
SP500 0.000 4.399*** 1.247*** -0.000 3.190*** 1.197*** 
 (0.849) (0.000) (0.000) (0.979) (0.000) (0.000) 
RATED 0.007*** -0.342* -0.728*** 0.003 -0.709*** -0.516*** 
 (0.003) (0.081) (0.000) (0.166) (0.000) (0.000) 
LAG   -0.014***   -0.022*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
COV_EA   0.260***   0.256*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
       
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant -0.039*** -7.686*** -8.972*** 0.038** -9.495*** -7.743*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Observations 21,249 26,984 26,984 21,249 26,984 26,984 






2.5.2. Investors’ Responses to Pre-announcement Media Coverage  
To test H2, Table 2.3 examines the relation between the information content of 
earnings announcements and the intensity of pre-announcement media coverage. 
Column (1) reports the result of estimating equation (2.2), without controlling for analyst 
forecast activity (FREQ and RESP). The coefficient on pre-announcement media 
coverage (COV_NONREP) is negative and significant (β = -0.192, p-value < 0.01), 
suggesting that the information content of earnings announcements decreases in the 
intensity of media coverage during the nonreport period. The coefficient on media 
coverage around earnings announcement (COV_EA) is significant and positive, 
suggesting that media coverage during the event window helps investors better process 
earnings news and increases the relative market reaction to earnings announcements. 
While COV_NONREP and COV_EA are significantly correlated, it seems that they have 
different effects on the informational role of earnings announcements. On the one hand, 
this finding is consistent with prior studies showing stronger price reactions after 
specific company disclosures for firms with high media coverage. On the other hand, it 
is consistent with my prediction of a weaker relative price reaction at earnings 
announcements for firms with higher pre-announcement media coverage. 
In Column (2), I include proxies for analyst forecast activity (FREQ and RESP). 
The coefficient on COV_NONREP remains significantly negative. From an economic 
perspective, the coefficient on COV_NONREP is -0.174, which represents 
approximately a 0.174% decrease in the relative abnormal return around earnings 






Table 2.3 The Effect of Pre-announcement Media Coverage on Price Revaluation 
(H2)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES RI RI RI RI_U RI_RAND       
COV_NONREP -0.192*** -0.174*** -0.166*** -0.493*** -0.948*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FREQ  -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.069*** -0.040* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.092) 
RESP  0.048*** 0.056*** 0.158*** 0.165*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
COV_EA 0.290*** 0.270*** 0.298*** 0.859*** 1.627*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE 0.069*** 0.051*** 0.065** 0.133** 0.210 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.022) (0.041) (0.211) 
LAG -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.015*** -0.011 
 (0.426) (0.245) (0.792) (0.001) (0.344) 
LN_ANALYSTS 0.055* -0.032 -0.078* 0.027 -0.862** 
 (0.070) (0.319) (0.069) (0.824) (0.016) 
INSTOWN 0.260*** 0.277*** 0.018 0.905*** 0.195 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.840) (0.000) (0.723) 
LOSS -0.205*** -0.193*** -0.104** -0.647*** -1.086*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.003) 
MF_ALONE -0.042 -0.026 -0.079* 0.175 0.990** 
 (0.288) (0.511) (0.080) (0.251) (0.025) 
MF_BUNDLE 0.173*** 0.137*** 0.116** 0.394** -0.458 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.015) (0.019) (0.321) 
8KS_NONREP -0.038*** -0.030*** -0.037*** -0.115*** -0.054 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.467) 
RATED 0.064 0.090** 0.224*** 0.095 -0.108 
 (0.118) (0.026) (0.000) (0.522) (0.796) 
EMP -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.504) (0.149) (0.738) 
SP500 -0.282*** -0.237*** -0.103 -0.920*** -0.993* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.249) (0.000) (0.068)       
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No Yes No No       
Constant -0.078 0.296** 0.554*** -0.721 3.777** 
 (0.606) (0.050) (0.005) (0.184) (0.026)       
Observations 26,984 26,984 26,984 25,261 26,984 
R-squared 0.105 0.114 0.257 0.104 0.014 
 
 
The negative and significant coefficient on FREQ suggests that analysts’ 




earnings announcements. The positive and significant coefficient on RESP suggests 
analysts’ activities during announcement window help the market better process 
earnings information or provide more information in the announcement period.  
Column (3) shows the results of a firm-fixed effect regression, to remove omitted 
time-invariant firm factors that may lead to spurious correlations between media 
coverage and investors’ anticipation of earnings-related information prior to earnings 
announcements. The coefficient on COV_NONREP remains significant and negative. In 
Column (4), I use an alternative market revaluation measure based on squared 
standardized residual returns to test the robustness of my results. This measure is used in 
prior studies (Beaver 1968; Landsman et al. 2012; Beaver et al. 2018). In Column (5), I 
construct another revaluation index measure using the ratio of the absolute value of 
cumulative abnormal return during the event window, to the absolute value of 
cumulative abnormal return during a random three-day window in the nonreport period. 
This measure (RI_RAND) aims to mitigate the possible mechanical correlation between 
pre-announcement media coverage and returns during the nonreport period. The results 
in Columns (4) and (5) show that the relation between pre-announcement media 
coverage and price revaluation is robust to using these two alternative measures. 
Overall, these results suggest that media coverage facilitates the incorporation of 
information prior to earnings announcements, and investors are less “surprised” by the 
information contained in earnings releases when pre-announcement media coverage is 
higher, consistent with my prediction in H2. Moreover, the effect of pre-announcement 




initiated disclosures, a wide range of variables that captures cross-sectional differences 
in firm characteristics, and firm and year fixed effects. 
 
2.5.3. Path and Cross-sectional Analysis  
This section examines whether pre-announcement media coverage has an indirect 
effect on investors’ responses to earnings announcement through analyst forecast 
frequency, as a proxy for analyst forecast activity. Table 2.4 presents the unstandardized 
path coefficients from the SEM estimation. Column (1) reports the direct effect of pre-
announcement media coverage (COV_NONREP) on analyst forecast frequency (FREQ), 
as well as the direct effect of pre-announcement media coverage (COV_NONREP) on 
revaluation index (RI). Column (2) reports the indirect path from media coverage to 
revaluation index mediated through analyst forecast frequency. The direct effect of -
0.174 relative to the total effect of -0.185 represents a mediated effect. The total 
mediated path for management forecast is significantly negative (0.486× (-0.022) = -
0.011, p-value < 0.01), suggesting that pre-announcement media coverage has a 
significant indirect effect on price revaluation during earnings announcements through 
the frequency of issuing analyst forecasts. 
Figure 2.1 presents the basic path diagram of both direct and indirect path paths 
between pre-announcement media coverage and the market response to earnings news; 
the standardized path coefficients estimates are presented on each path. Approximately 
5% of the total effect of media coverage on price revaluation is mediated through analyst 




forecast is an important driver of decreased information content of earnings 
announcements.  
 









FREQ    
COV_NONREP 0.486***  0.486*** 
 (5.31)  (5.31) 
    
RI    
FREQ -0.022***  -0.022*** 
 (-10.91)  (-10.91) 
    
COV_NONREP -0.174*** -0.011*** -0.185*** 
 (-9.59) (-4.88) (-10.15) 
    









As complementary analysis, I examine the cross-sectional variations in the 




based on analyst forecasts. To construct the partitioning variables, I use the number of 
analysts following the firm (LN_ANALYSTS) to capture a firm’s overall analyst 
exposure, and the number of earnings forecasts issued (FREQ) to capture analysts’ 
responsiveness to information. The correlation coefficient between LN_ANALYSTS and 
FREQ is 0.572 (p-value < 0.01), and the correlation coefficient between 
RANK_ANALYSTS and RANK_FREQ is 0.643 (p-value < 0.01). While LN_ANALYSTS 
and FREQ are highly correlated, they intend to capture different perspective of analyst 
forecasts. 
 Table 2.5 reports the estimation of equation (2.4). In column (1), the coefficient 
on COV_NONREP*RANK_FREQ is significantly negative at the 0.01 level, indicating 
the role of pre-announcement media coverage in preempting information in earnings 
announcements is more pronounced when analyst forecast is more frequent. In column 
(2), the coefficient on COV_NONREP*RANK_ANALYSTS is significantly negative at the 
1 percent level, indicating that the strength of the negative relation between media 
coverage and price revaluation at earnings announcements increases with the number of 
analysts following the firm. The evidence is consistent with financial analysts playing an 







Table 2.5 Cross-Sectional Variation in Price Revaluation based on Analyst 
Forecasts (H3) 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES RI RI 
    
COV_NONREP -0.067* -0.063* 
 (0.057) (0.076) 
COV_NONREP*RANK_FREQ -0.058***  
 (0.000)  
COV_NONREP*RANK_ANALYSTS  -0.059*** 
  (0.000) 
RANK_FREQ -0.019 -0.153*** 
 (0.621) (0.000) 
RANK_ANALYSTS -0.054* 0.078* 
 (0.060) (0.068)    
Controls Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes    
Constant 0.220 0.225 
 (0.173) (0.161)    
Observations 26,984 26,984 
R-squared 0.112 0.112 
 
 
2.6. Enhancing Identification   
2.6.1. Instrumental Variable Tests 
A potential concern with my main analyses is the endogeneity of media 
coverage, which could be affected by correlated omitted variables. For example, the 
media could choose to cover firms with more efficient prices. To address the potential 
endogeneity problem, I use two-stage least squares (2SLS) tests, adopting an 
instrumental variable (IV) that is arguably exogenous to stock price movement to 
capture the variations in media coverage. Following Drake et al. (2014) and Ahn et al. 
(2019), I use the lagged media coverage during the nonreport period 
(COV_NONREP_LAG) as the instrument. The underlying rationale is that media 




media coverage, given the persistent nature of media coverage. Meanwhile, the prior 
year media coverage is unlikely to directly influence investors’ reaction to earnings 
announcements or analysts’ forecasts in the current year.  
The results from the system of equations are presented in the Panel A of Table 
2.6. All controls are included in both the first-stage and second-stage models. Only the 
coefficients of interest are presented. Columns (1) – (6) present the instrumental variable 
tests of the relation between pre-announcement media coverage (COV_NONREP_NA) 
and analyst forecast characteristics (H1).  
The first stage predicts the pre-announcement media coverage for each firm-year 
as a function of lagged media coverage (COV_NONREP_LAG). The second stage 
estimates equation (2.1) with the variable of interest being the predicted value for pre-
announcement media coverage from the first stage. Columns (1), (3) and (5) present the 
finding that the IV is significantly and positively related to nonreport period media 
coverage in the first stage regression, which strongly rejects the null hypothesis of weak 
instruments. In Columns (2), (4) and (6), the results are consistent with the main results 
reported earlier. Columns (7) and (8) reports the instrumental variable tests of the 
relation between pre-announcement media coverage (COV_NONREP) and revaluation 
index (H2). I find that the coefficient for the instrumented media coverage is 
significantly negative, consistent with the main findings. 
 
2.6.2. Matched Sample Tests 




not randomly assigned, I also repeat all the main analyses using an industry-year-size-
disclosures matched sample. Although this approach does not resolve the endogeneity 
problem per se, to the extent that there is an endogenous determinant of media coverage, 
matching methods could mitigate some of the omitted variable concerns (Roberts and 
Whited 2013). Specifically, for each firm in my sample, I find a matched firm in the 
same industry, in the same year, in the same size decile, and in the same decile of firm-
initiated disclosures (as measured by the number of 8-K filings during the fiscal period), 
but with the largest difference in pre-announcement media coverage. Untabulated t-tests 
show insignificant differences in firm size (SIZE) and the level of 8-K disclosures 
between matched pairs. This procedure produces a sample of 7,840 firm-year 
observations. I then rerun all my analyses using this matched subsample and report the 
results in Panel B of Table 2.6. All the main inferences remain unchanged. 
 
2.6.3. Changed Sample Tests 
To further enhance the link between media coverage and investors’ reactions, I 
identify 7,020 firm-year observations from year t to year t+1 during my sample period 
and perform a within-sample analysis. 14  Empirically, observations in year t serve as the 
control group, while observations in year t+1 serve as the treatment group. I rank the 
changes in nonreport period from year t to t+1 into terciles 
                                                 
14 Examining the differences of firm characteristics between the treatment group and control group reveals 
that the several characteristics such as firm size, 8-K disclosures and analyst following are significantly 
different. Therefore, it is likely that the changes in media coverage is not exogenous. In additional to other 
robustness check, this analysis serves as a complementary test to mitigate some of omitted variable 




(RANK_INCREASE_NONREP) and consider this the treatment level each firm received 
in year t+1. I then test whether the dependent variables in my main tests are associated 
with the treatment (i.e., increases in media coverage from year t to t+1). The regression 
results are presented in Panel C of Table 2.6. The results are consistent with the main 
findings. 
 
2.6.4. Sample without Firm-initiated Disclosures  
To further eliminate the effect of firm-initiated disclosures, I construct a 
subsample without any firm-initiated disclosures (i.e., SEC 8-K fillings and management 
guidance) from 61 trading days before to one day after earnings announcements (i.e., [-
61, +1] relative to earnings announcement date). This subsample contains 3,338 firm-
year observations. I repeat all my main regressions and report the results in Panel D of 
Table 2.6. I find that the pre-announcement media coverage is positively associated with 
analyst forecast accuracy and forecast frequency, and negatively associated with the 
revolution index. However, I do not find a significant relation between pre-
announcement media coverage and analyst responsiveness to earnings announcements, 
possibly due to the small sample size.  
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Table 2.6 Robustness checks 
Panel A: Instrumental Variable Tests 






















RESP COV_NONREP RI 
          
COV_NONREP 
_LAG 
0.557***  0.531***  0.374***  0.362***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
COV_NONREP 
_NA 
 0.005***  0.422***  -0.194**   
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.015)   
COV_NONREP        -0.199*** 
        (0.000) 
         
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant 0.284*** -0.064*** 0.150** -9.810*** -0.045 -7.033*** -0.212*** 1.819*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.499) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
Observations 17,947 17,947 22,449 22,449 22,449 22,449 22,449 22,449 
R-squared 0.515 0.180 0.515 0.499 0.576 0.577 0.599 0.106 
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Table 2.6 (Continued) 
Panel B: Matched Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ACCURACY FREQ RESP RI 
      
COV_NONREP_NA 0.004*** 0.568*** -0.090*  
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.083)  
COV_NONREP    -0.162*** 
    (0.000) 
FREQ    -0.227*** 
    (0.000) 
RESP    0.054*** 
    (0.000) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant -0.037** -8.475*** -9.503*** 0.241 
 (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.299) 
     
Observations 6,176 7,840 7,840 7,840 
R-squared 0.175 0.507 0.568 0.130 
 
 
Table 2.6 (Continued) 
Panel C: Changed Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ACCURACY FREQ RESP RI 
     
RANK_INCREASE_NONREP 0.003** 0.703*** -0.244*** -0.112*** 
 (0.043) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FREQ    -0.031*** 
    (0.000) 
RESP    0.057*** 
    (0.000) 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant -0.041** -8.391*** -10.075*** 0.038 
 (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.898) 
     
Observations 5,621 7,020 7,020 7,020 






Table 2.6 (Continued) 
Panel D: Subsample without firm disclosures  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ACCURACY FREQ RESP RI 
       
COV_NONREP_NA 0.006*** 0.381*** 0.228  
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.120)  
COV_NONREP    -0.117*** 
    (0.006) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant -0.028* -3.563*** -4.615*** 0.610* 
 (0.074) (0.000) (0.000) (0.056) 
     
Observations 2,092 3,338 3,338 3,338 




In sum, by using instrumental variable tests, matched and changed sample 
analyses, and a small sample without firm-initiated disclosures, I provide robust 
evidence that media coverage improves analysts’ and investors’ earnings expectations 
and facilitates the diffusion of earnings-related information prior to earnings 
announcements. 15, 16 
                                                 
15 My main prediction is that pre-announcement media coverage helps investors anticipate information 
prior to earnings announcements and preempts the information content of earnings announcements. If the 
business press tends to cover newsworthy disclosures, or certain firm characteristics elicit press coverage, 
then media coverage would be positively associated with the magnitude of new information in earnings 
announcements. This type of endogeneity would bias against my results, thus, it is less of a concern in this 
study. 
16 Drake et al. (2014) point out that firms covered by the business press could be fundamentally different 
from those not covered by the business press. To further ensure that this type of selection bias does not 
significantly affect my results of this study, I remove the 1,537 firm-year observations with no media 




2.7. Additional Analyses 
2.7.1. Types of News Events 
I next explore the types of news events that help analysts and investors to form 
their earnings expectations. Almost a quarter (24.07%) of the articles in my sample are 
about earnings, including earnings announcements and management earnings guidance 
(see Appendix B). The remaining articles include stories on underlying economic 
activities such as product releases and labor conditions that investors could arguably use 
to improve their earnings expectations. However, given investors’ information-
processing constraints, it is possible that investors only pay attention to news 
emphasizing earnings numbers. As a result, the effects of pre-announcement media 
coverage could be mainly driven by the dissemination of earnings news releases.  
Using RavenPack’s news event categories, I test the relation between media 
coverage and market earnings expectations (ACCURACY and RI). Specifically, I 
measure the volume of news articles related to “Earnings” (COV_NONREP_EARN) and 
the volume of news articles that are not directly related to “Earnings” 
(COV_NONREP_NONEARN) during the non-report period (i.e., 60 trading days ending 
two days prior to earnings announcements). I further separate news events that are not 
directly related to earnings into five groups: insider trading, revenue, product services, 
labor issues, and all other types of news events such as legal issues, acquisitions, etc. To 
test analysts’ anticipation of earnings, I exclude news articles directly related to analyst 
                                                 




forecasts, and append “_NA” to each of the media coverage by event types to indicate 
each of these measures after excluding news articles that are directly related to analyst 
forecast.  
Estimation results are reported in Table 2.7. Column (1) shows that only non-
earnings-related media coverage is significantly and positively associated with analyst 
forecast accuracy, while earnings-related media coverage has no significant effect on 
analyst forecast accuracy. In contrast, in column (3), both earnings-related media 
coverage and non-earnings-related media coverage are significantly and negatively 
associated with the revaluation index. Moreover, these two coefficients are not 
significantly different from each other (F-statistic = 1.35, p-value = 0.25). The results in 
columns (2) and (4) provide further evidence that analysts and investors gain different 
type of information from media coverage. Overall, the results in Table 2.7 support my 
conjecture that news reports that are not directly related to earnings numbers (e.g., 
product services, labor issues, etc.) during the nonreport period also improve investors’ 
expectations of upcoming earnings news in earnings announcements. 
 
2.7.2. Information Generation or Information Dissemination  
In my main analyses, I expect media coverage to reduce investors’ information 
acquisition and processing costs, thereby increasing the amount of information that 
analysts and investors can assimilate prior to earnings announcements. This effect of 
media coverage could be attributable to the role of information generation and/or the role 




Table 2.7 Types of News Events 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ACCURACY ACCURACY RI RI      
COV_NONREP_EARN 
(_NA) 
0.000 -0.001 -0.117*** -0.081*** 
 (0.695) (0.328) (0.000) (0.000) 
COV_NONREP_NONEAR
N (_NA) 
0.003***  -0.145***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
COV_NONREP_INSIDER 
(_NA) 
 0.002**  -0.023 
  (0.012)  (0.115) 
COV_NONREP_REV  
(_NA) 
 0.005***  -0.119*** 
  (0.006)  (0.000) 
COV_NONREP_PROD 
(_NA) 
 -0.002*  -0.062*** 
  (0.095)  (0.003) 
COV_NONREP_LABOR 
(_NA) 
 0.000  0.023 
  (0.734)  (0.239) 
COV_NONREP_OTHER 
(_NA) 
 0.002***  -0.194*** 
  (0.007)  (0.000)      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes      
Constant -0.038*** -0.038*** 0.306** 0.202 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.044) (0.181)      
Observations 21,249 21,249 26,984 26,984 
R-squared 0.168 0.168 0.114 0.117 
 
To provide insight on the mechanism through which the business press diffuses 
information, I examine whether the relation between analysts’ and investors’ responses 
to earnings related information and pre-announcement media coverage varies with the 
formats of news articles. Specifically, I decompose the total media coverage into full 
articles and other newswire articles (i.e., news flashes, tabular material and press 
releases distributed by Dow Jones).17 News flashes typically just rebroadcast company-
                                                 
17 RavenPack classifies news story into five categories: hot news flash, news flash, full article, press 




initiated disclosures, while full articles usually include additional editorial content. See 
Appendix C for examples of different types of news stories. Following Drake et al. 
(2014) and Bonsall et al. (2018b), I use the log transformed number of news flashes 
(COV_NONREP_WIRE) as a proxy for the level of information dissemination and the 
log transformed number of full articles (COV_NONREP_FULL) as a proxy for the level 
of information generation. I further exclude news articles that are directly related to 
financial analyst forecasts, and append “_NA” to each of the media coverage by news 
format to indicate non-analyst-related media coverage, for testing analyst forecast 
accuracy. Not surprisingly, the level of information generation is significantly and 
positively correlated with the level of information dissemination (correlation coefficient 
is 0.420, p-value < 0.01), suggesting that the media tends to report news events in 
various formats. 
In Table 2.8, columns (1) – (3) reports the estimation results for analyst forecast 
accuracy, columns (4) – (6) reports the estimation results for the revaluation index. I find 
that the level of information generation (COV_NONREP_NA_FULL and 
COV_NONREP_FULL) and the level of information dissemination 
(COV_NONREP_NA_WIRE and COV_NONREP_WIRE) both improve market 
participants’ anticipation and processing of earnings-related information prior to 
                                                 
release and tabular material are firm disclosures distributed via Dow Jones Newswire. Full articles include 
mostly textual material with additional editorial content. In my sample, 37.68% of news reports are full-
text articles, and 39.96% of news reports are news flashes. Drake et al. (2014) use news flashes only to 
proxy for the level of information dissemination. My inference that the effect of information dissemination 
is stronger than the effect of information generation does not change, if I only use news flashes measure 




earnings announcements, respectively.  
 
Table 2.8 Information Dissemination and Information Generation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ACCURACY RI 
  
      
COV_NONREP_NA_FULL (β1) 0.002*** 
 
0.001** 
   
  (0.004) 
 
(0.032) 








   
COV_NONREP_FULL (β1) 










    
-0.224*** -0.216*** 
  
    
(0.000) (0.000) 
  
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Observations 21,249 21,241 21,241 26,984 26,984 26,984 
R-squared 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.111 0.115 0.115 
 
 
In column (3), the effect of information dissemination is not significantly 
different from that of information generation (difference p-value < 0.01), while in 
column (6), the effect of information dissemination is stronger than that of information 
generation (difference p-value < 0.01). This suggests that the effect of information 
dissemination dominates the effect of information generation on preempting the 
information content of earnings announcements. However, the two roles of media 
coverage seem to have similar effect on improving analysts forecast accuracy. Because 
of the highly significant correlation between information dissemination and information 






2.7.3. Sources of Information 
This section provides some insight on the relative importance of media coverage 
versus other information sources that investors have access to. Following Beyer et al 
(2010), I examine the contribution of media coverage, analyst forecasts, management 
guidance, firm SEC filings, and earnings announcement to the information reflected in 
stock prices. Specifically, I estimate a simple decomposition of total stock return using 
the following regression:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅_𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑅_𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐴 +  𝛽2𝐶𝐴𝑅_𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐴𝑅_𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑅 +
𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑅_𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐴𝑅_𝐸𝐴 +  𝜀,          (5) 
where CAR_TOTAL is the cumulative size adjusted abnormal return from 61 trading 
days before to one day after earnings announcements (i.e., [-61, +1] relative to earnings 
announcement date). For each type of event (e.g., media report or analyst forecast), 
CAR_EVENT is the sum over all events of that type in the nonreport period of the 3-day 
cumulative size adjusted abnormal return centered on each event. CAR_EVENT is 0 for a 
given event type if there are no events of that type. If an analyst forecast, management 
guidance or a firm-initiated 8-K disclosure is issued concurrently with a media news 
report, CAR_MEDIA is coded as zero and only include the cumulative abnormal returns 
around the other disclosure events. This procedure results in a lower bound estimate of 
the contribution of media coverage to the stock price variance. CAR_EA is the 3-day 




In Table 2.9, the results indicate that, for an average firm, 49.1% of the stock 
return variance for the estimation period is explained by pre-announcement events (i.e., 
media coverage, analyst forecasts, management guidance and firm-initiated SEC filings 
prior to earnings announcement) and the earnings announcement. Importantly, media 
coverage prior to earnings announcement accounts for 41.9% (partial R2 = 20.6%; 
20.6%/49.1% = 41.9%) of the total information provided by financial analysts, 
managers, firms and the media. This analysis suggests that while media reports, analyst 
forecasts, management guidance, and SEC 8-K disclosures are incorporated in investors’ 
expectations of earnings, the biggest contributor is the media coverage. 
 
2.7.4. Good News and Bad News 
In my main analyses, I focus on the relation between media coverage and the magnitude 
of news contained in earnings announcements, without considering the sign of the news 
in earnings announcements. Kothari et al. (2009) document asymmetric stock market 
reactions to the public releases of bad versus good news and argue that managers tend to 
withhold bad news up to a certain threshold. This section examines whether pre-
announcement media coverage mitigates the asymmetric market reactions to bad news 
disclosures in earnings announcements. 
52 
 
Table 2.9 Information Dissemination and Information Generation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES CAR_TOTAL CAR_TOTAL CAR_TOTAL CAR_TOTAL CAR_TOTAL CAR_TOTAL Partial R2 
         
Business press report (CAR_MEDIA) 0.158***     0.121*** 0.206 
 (0.000)     (0.000)  
Analyst forecast (CAR_ANALYST)  0.078***    0.041*** 0.097 
  (0.000)    (0.000)  
Management forecast (CAR_MANAGER)   0.896***   0.358*** 0.022 
   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Firm disclosure (CAR_FIRM)    0.033***  0.010*** 0.009 
    (0.000)  (0.000)  
Earnings announcement (CAR_EA)     0.965*** 0.981*** 0.157 
     (0.000) (0.000)  
Intercept 0.016*** 0.006*** 0.019*** 0.008*** 0.020*** 0.003***  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
        
Observations 26,984 26,984 26,984 26,984 26,984 26,984  




Niessner and So (2018) find that media coverage is titled toward negative events. 
If the pre-announcement media coverage warns investors about bad news ahead of 
earnings announcements, then the asymmetric reactions to bad news will be smaller. 
Following Kothari et al.’s (2009) methodology, I examine the effect of pre-
announcement media coverage on investors’ asymmetric reactions to good versus bad 
news in earnings announcements. Specifically, I define bad news by an indicator 
variable (BADNEWS) that equals one if earnings surprise (UE) is negative, and zero 
otherwise. Table 2.10 presents the regression result of stock price behavior around 
earnings announcements.  
Column (1) reports the baseline regression. The average price reaction to good 
news release is 0.97% and to bad news release is -1.87% (=-2.84%+0.97%), with the 
difference in the magnitude of these reactions being significant (F-statistic=81.31). 
Column (2) introduces an indicator variable that equals one if pre-announcement media 
coverage is in the top tercile (HIGH_COV). The coefficient on the interaction term 
(BADNEWS*HIGH_COV) is positive and significant, suggesting that the asymmetric 
market reactions to good versus bad news in earnings announcements are mitigated for 
high media coverage firms. Column (3) controls for the size of the earnings surprise 
(UE) and the coefficient on the interaction term remains positive and significant. In 
Column (4), I replace the dummy variable for high media coverage with the level of 
media coverage (COV_NONREP), the coefficient on BADNEWS*COV_NONREP 
remains positive and significant (p<0.01). Column (5) includes additional variables from 




determinants of media coverage, year fixed effects, and industry fixed effects. My 
inference does not change. Overall, these results suggest that pre-announcement media 
coverage mitigates investors’ asymmetric reactions to good news versus bad news in 
earnings announcements, possibly through broadcasting bad news prior to earnings 
announcements.  
 
Table 2.10 Asymmetry Market Reactions to Good News versus Bad News 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES CAR [-1,+1] CAR [-1,+1] CAR [-1,+1] CAR [-1,+1] CAR [-1,+1] 
       
BADNEWS -0.028*** -0.032*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.039*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HIGH_COV  -0.001 -0.007***   
  (0.526) (0.000)   
BADNEWS*HIGH_COV  0.009*** 0.015***   
  (0.001) (0.000)   
COV_NONREP    -0.001 -0.001* 
    (0.100) (0.060) 
BADNEWS*COV_NONREP    0.003*** 0.003*** 
    (0.005) (0.003) 
UE   0.003 0.056 0.045 
   (0.963) (0.124) (0.215) 
      
Controls No No No No Yes 
Year fixed effects No No No No Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No No No Yes 
      
Constant 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.035*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Observations 26,984 18,410 14,348 21,249 21,249 






3. THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN THE PRICING OF INDUSTRY-WIDE 
EARNINGS INFORMATION 
 
3.1. Introduction to Section 3 
An emerging stream of research has recently recognized the role of the media as 
an information intermediary in facilitating price discovery (e.g., Drake et al. 2014; 
Twedt 2016; Guest 2017). Questions about the role of the media in capital markets are 
relevant because the media is the broadest and most widely disseminated among all 
potential information intermediaries in the capital markets (Bushee e al. 2010). An 
individual firm’s earnings and stock prices reflect both firm-specific and industry-wide 
economic fundamentals (Ball and Brown 1968; Hui et al. 2016). Media coverage could 
act as a conduit for intra-industry information transfers and affect investors’ processing 
of industry-wide information. However, since extant studies on the role of media mainly 
focus on the effect of media coverage at the firm-level, we know little about the role of 
media coverage in the pricing of earnings-related information at the industry-level. This 
study attempts to fill this void in the literature by examining whether the media coverage 
enhances or detracts from the timely market response to industry-wide earnings 
information. 
Prior studies suggest that the market is slow to incorporate aggregated industry-
related information and that investors systematically underreact to industry-wide 
information (Hou 2007; Hui and Yeung 2013; Hui et al. 2016). This is possibly because 




and thus is more costly for investors to identify, aggregate and assimilate. Nevertheless, 
each firm’s news potentially conveys information that is pertinent to the broader set of 
firms in its industry. Media coverage can facilitate intra-industry information transfer by 
directing investors’ attention to a broader set of related firms and providing investors 
with aggregated industry-wide information. Therefore, media coverage could allow 
stock prices to incorporate industry information more promptly and mitigate investors’ 
underreaction to industry-wide earnings information.  
However, it is possible that media coverage has no or an adverse effect on the 
pricing of industry-wide earnings information. Media coverage at the firm level could 
drive more attention to firm-specific information and distract attention from the 
aggregated industry-wide information. Previous studies have documented the role of the 
press in improving the pricing of firm-specific information. For example, Drake et al. 
(2014) show that press coverage of earnings announcements mitigates the market 
mispricing of cash flow information. Ahn et al. (2019) find that press coverage of 
analyst recommendations decreases post-revision price drift. Both studies argue that the 
wide dissemination of firm-specific information better informs the market about the 
disclosed information. Given investors’ limited attention and information processing 
capacity (Hirshleifer et al., 2009), media coverage may detract from the timely market 
response to industry-wide earnings information if media coverage drives investors’ 
attention mainly towards firm-specific information. Furthermore, understanding the 
implications of firm-specific and industry-wide earnings information may require 




effect the media has on the pricing of industry-wide earnings information. 
To determine whether media coverage reduces investors’ underreaction to 
industry-wide earnings information, I decompose annual earnings into industry-wide and 
firm-specific earnings information following Hui et al. (2016), and test the post-
announcement drift associated with industry-wide earnings. I obtain media coverage 
from the RavenPack Dow Jones database during the period from 2010 to 2016. Because 
I expect that news coverage about firm’s underlying economic activities, like product 
releases and labor conditions, could affect investors’ understanding and interpretation of 
earnings-related information, I use business press coverage of a broad range of news 
events (not only earnings-related news) over the fiscal year period to measure media 
coverage. I find that media coverage during the year mitigates investors’ underreaction 
to industry-wide earnings, suggesting that media coverage increases the diffusion of 
industry-wide information and improves investors’ timely responses to industry-wide 
earnings information. 
To provide further evidence on the role of the media in aggregating and 
disseminating industry information, I perform cross-sectional analyses to examine two 
situations in which media coverage has a more pronounced effect on the pricing of 
industry-wide information. First, I evaluate the level of information disseminated or 
produced by the media that is common to an industry. I argue that the media plays two 
roles: (1) identifying, extracting and widely disseminating common industry information 
and (2) attracting investors’ attention to a broader range of related firms within an 




firm level, I define a news article as industry-related news if there is at least one other 
news article of the same event type for a different company in the same industry on the 
same day. This measure captures the common industry news that the media identifies 
and disseminates. At the industry level, I calculate the concentration of news coverage 
for each industry-year using the Herfindahl index of media coverage. This measure 
captures the breadth of media coverage of related firms in the same industry. My cross-
sectional analyses show that the mitigating effect of media coverage on the delayed 
pricing of industry-wide earnings is stronger for firms with high percentages of industry-
level news reports, or for firms within an industry with wide-spread news coverage.  
Second, I consider the conditions that are conducive to intra-industry information 
transfer. If media coverage improves the pricing of industry-wide information by 
facilitating intra-industry information transfer, then this effect should be stronger among 
firms in which performance comparison and information sharing with other firms is 
relatively easy. Using product similarity or earnings movement as conditions conducive 
to intra-industry information transfer, I find that the mitigating effect of media coverage 
on the delayed pricing of industry-wide earnings information is stronger when intra-
industry information transfer is easier. Taken together, my cross-sectional analyses 
suggest that the media efficiently aggregates and disseminates value-relevant common 
information within the industry, and also facilitates intra-industry information transfers.  
Lastly, I explore two alternative measures for the diffusion of industry-wide 
information into stock prices. First, I test the effect of industry-level news coverage on 




firm-specific information being incorporated into stock prices (Roll 1988; Piotroski and 
Roulstone 2004). I find that industry-level news coverage is positively associated with 
price synchronicity, supporting my conjecture that industry-level media coverage 
improves intra-industry information transfer and increases the amount of common 
industry information in stock prices. Second, I examine whether the extent of intra-
industry information transfer around earnings announcement varies with the announcing 
firms’ media coverage prior to earnings announcements. When an earnings 
announcement contains industry-wide information, the stock prices of the announcing 
firm and its peer firms move in the same direction. If media coverage of the announcing 
firm increases the industry information diffusion and production prior to the earnings 
announcement, then the announcing firm’s earnings announcement will contain less 
news pertinent to non-announcing firms. Consistent with this argument, I find that the 
strength of industry information transfer from earnings announcements is negatively 
associated with announcing firms’ pre-announcement media coverage.      
My study contributes to the literature on the role of the media as a financial 
information intermediary in the capital markets. Evolving research shows that the media 
plays an important role in capital markets by attracting attention, disseminating news and 
providing information (e.g., Tetlock 2014; Bushee et al. 2010; Rogers et al. 2016). The 
extant studies focus primarily on the effect of media coverage at the firm-level, such as 
on stock returns and trading volume. This study contributes to this literature by 
investigating the externalities of firm-specific media coverage and the role of the media 




literature has documented the role of financial analysts in improving intra-industry 
information transfers (Piotroski and Roulston 2004; Hilary and Shen 2013; Muslu et al. 
2014). My analyses suggest that the media also serves as an important information 
intermediary in facilitating the pricing of industry-wide information. Lastly, I add to the 
literature on the role that financial intermediaries play in the pricing of accounting 
information. Drake et al. (2014) show that while press coverage of earnings 
announcements significantly reduces cash flow mispricing, it has a negligible effect on 
accrual mispricing. While their study is interested in earnings components determined by 
accounting systems (cash flow and accruals), my focus is on earnings components 
determined by economic fundamentals (industry-wide and firm-specific). My findings 
highlight the important role of the media in facilitating the pricing of accounting 
information that is influenced by underlying economic activities. 
 
3.2. Literature Review, Motivation and Hypothesis Development 
3.2.1. The Media as an Information Intermediary 
While a long-standing literature examines the role of financial intermediaries 
such as equity financial analysts in capital markets (e.g., Givoly 1985, Lys and Sohn 
1990, Bradshaw 2011), researchers have recently started to recognize the role of the 
media as an essential financial intermediary. The media has access to a broad range of 
information and disseminates news to a wide audience on a continual basis, therefore, it 
is important to understand the role of the media as an information intermediary in price 




disseminating news, and providing information (Tetlock 2014). 
One stream of literature provides evidence on the relation between media 
coverage and general stock market consequences such as stock prices, trading volume, 
and liquidity. Using the number of newspaper articles about specific stocks to proxy for 
media exposure, Fang and Peress (2009) find significant association between media 
coverage and stock returns. Rogers et al. (2016) examine the market effects of media 
coverage of insider trading filings with the SEC. They find a substantial increase in 
trading volume within the two-minute window following media coverage of insider 
trading filings on the Dow Jones Newswire. Relatedly, Blankespoor et al. (2018) find 
that media synthesis and dissemination of earnings announcements increase both trading 
volume and liquidity. While all these studies focus on the dissemination role of media 
coverage of firm-specific news, Tetlock et al. (2008) investigate a different perspective 
of media coverage, the qualitative information in media coverage. They show that the 
negative words used in a broad set of firm-specific newspaper stories predicts future 
earnings and future returns. 
Another stream of literature examines the role of media coverage in the price 
discovery role of accounting information. Drake et al. (2014) find that while press 
coverage of earnings announcements mitigates cash flow mispricing, it has a negligible 
effect on accruals mispricing. They attribute this effect to the media’s dissemination 
function (news flash articles) rather than its role in information creation (full articles).18   
                                                 
18 News flashes typically contains a headline only and just rebroadcast company-initiated disclosures, 




Twedt (2016) finds that press coverage of management earnings guidance is associated 
with larger initial price reactions and an increase in the speed with which guidance 
information is incorporated into price. Similarly, Ahn et al. (2019) document that 
broader press coverage of analyst forecast revisions is associated with a stronger initial 
market reaction to recommendation revisions as well as less post-revision drift. Using a 
series of restructuring events at the Wall Street Journal to capture the variations in 
earnings-related media coverage, Guest (2017) shows that Wall Street Journal articles 
covering earnings press releases increase price response coefficients for earnings 
surprises (ERCs) around earnings announcements.  
It is notable that extant studies examining the capital market consequences of 
media coverage generally focus on the effect of media coverage at the firm-level. Peer 
firms play an important role in shaping the firm’s information environment (Shroff et al. 
2017). A firm’s stock price is a function of the entire information set available to market 
participants, not just its information set (Schipper 1990). Studies on intra-industry 
information transfers document that one firm’s disclosures affect the stock prices of peer 
firms. In contrast to prior studies on the role of media coverage, my study considers a 
broad range of business news and examines the effect of media coverage in the pricing 
of earnings-related information at the industry-level. 
 
3.2.2. The Underreaction to the Industry-wide Earnings Information 
Earnings are one of the most important summary measures of firm performance; 




and production technology) and firm-specific factors (e.g., competitive position).19 
Economic theory (e.g., Mueller 1977; Waring 1996) suggests that industry fundamentals 
(such as demand and supply, labor market, and regulatory environment) are more 
persistent than firm-specific fundamentals (such as management styles and business 
models).20 This is because firm-level performance above or below the industry norm 
tends to be transitory because of mimicking or learning from competitive industry peers. 
Consistent with this view, Ahmed (1994) finds a negative relationship between the 
degree of competition and the change in firm value associated with earnings surprises, 
because the higher the competition in the firm’s product markets, the lower the firm’s 
ability to sustain future economic rents.  
Consistent with economic theory, Hui et al. (2016) show that the industry-wide 
component of earnings is significantly more persistent than the firm-specific component. 
Moreover, they find that investors do not fully appreciate this difference and instead 
price securities as if the two components are equally persistent. Consequently, equity 
prices underweight the persistence of the industry-wide component of earnings and 
overweight the persistence of the firm-specific component. Additionally, Hui and Yeung 
(2013) show that post-forecast revision drift is mainly attributable to investors’ 
underreaction to industry-wide earnings news and explain that this occurs because 
                                                 
19 Practitioners have emphasized the importance of understanding macroeconomic and industry-level 
information in forecasting earnings. For example, analysts frequently refer to macro- and industry-related 
issues in their research reports (Jackson et al. 2018). In this study, I follow Hui et al. (2016) and use 
industry-wide earnings to capture both the impact of market-wide forces on each industry and industry-
specific earnings information. 
20 In this study, I follow Hui et al. (2016) and use industry-wide earnings to capture both the impact of 




investors do not fully appreciate the differential earnings persistence attributable to 
industry fundamentals. In a similar vein, Kovacs (2016) examines the role of intra-
industry information transfers in post-earnings announcement drift and finds that 
investors’ slow reaction to industry-wide information is a significant contributor to the 
analyst forecast-based post-earnings announcement drift.  
Research in finance and accounting finds that slow information diffusion and 
limited investor attention contribute to the delayed pricing of industry information. For 
example, Hou (2007) finds that the slow diffusion of industry information is a major 
cause of the lead-lag effect of stock returns. Additionally, Hoberg and Phillips (2018) 
argue that industry peer firms identified through their product descriptions in 10-K 
filings are less visible than published traditional industry links such as SIC codes. 21 
They show that investor inattention to less visible industry peers contributes to the slow 
adjustment of prices to peer earnings shocks and thus increases industry level post-
earnings announcement drift, and conclude that slow propagation of information across 
less visible economic links plays a strong role in driving industry momentum. Intuitively, 
industry wide information is dispersed among different firms within the same industry 
and thus is more costly for investors to identify and assimilate than firm-specific 
information. 
 
                                                 
21 Product-based textual network industry classification (TNIC), developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2016, 
2010), is a new industry classification that defines industry peers as firms that use common vocabulary in 




3.2.3. Media Coverage and the Pricing of Industry-wide Earnings 
The literature on intra-industry information transfers finds that the stock prices of 
non-disclosing firms may increase or decrease following disclosures made by their 
peers, and concludes that a specific firm’s disclosures contain industry-wide 
information. To date, academic researchers have provided ample evidence of intra-
industry information transfers in various forms, such as earnings announcements, 
management earnings forecasts, and accounting restatements (Baginski 1987; Xu et al. 
2006; Freeman and Tse 1992; Ayers and Freeman 1997). These studies suggest that 
news about related firms provides useful information to investors who are interested in 
assessing the value of the focal firm. I conjecture that value relevant information at the 
industry-level is dispersed across related firms in an industry, hence its pricing depends 
on how quickly this widely dispersed information is aggregated and processed by market 
participants and then becomes reflected in stock prices. Media coverage acts as a conduit 
for intra-industry information transfers, facilitating the timely pricing of industry-wide 
information. 
I argue that the media coverage serves two roles in the diffusion of industry 
information. First, the business press often identifies and reports related news, or 
benchmarks firms’ results to broader industry outcomes. This could help investors 
extract the common industry information from dispersed firms’ news and better 
understand the information content of industry-wide versus firm-specific earnings 
components (see examples in Appendix D). Second, the business press improves intra-




particular industry guides investors’ attention to related peer firms and speeds up price 
reactions to related common news. As a result, media coverage could improve investors’ 
timely responses to industry-wide earnings, and mitigate their under-reaction to industry-
wide earnings information by providing industry news and facilitating intra-industry 
information transfers. Formally, I state my first hypothesis in an alternative form:  
H1: Media coverage is positively associated with investors’ timely responses to 
industry-wide earnings information. 
 
3.2.4. Cross-Sectional Variation 
The strength of information transfers among firms in the industry depends on 
many factors, including disclosing and non-disclosing firms’ characteristics, related 
firms’ information quality, and the activities of market participants. Kim et al. (2008) 
show that the type of information transfers from the same management forecast can be 
positive or negative based on the characteristics of the information receiver (e.g., rival or 
nonrival peer firms). Specifically, they find negative (positive) information transfers 
between forecasting firms and non-forecasting rival (nonrival) firms in the same 
industry. In addition, Ma (2017) provides evidence that related firms’ information 
quality reduces a firm’s market risk and shows that the effect is stronger for the firm 
with higher earnings correlation with related firms. Moreover, Piotroski and Roulstone 
(2004) suggest that market participants (e.g., analysts and institutional investors) 
facilitate the intra-industry information transfers through their relative information 




While my first hypothesis focuses on the effect of overall media coverage, my 
second hypothesis considers situations in which the effect of media coverage on the 
diffusion of industry-wide information are likely to be stronger. Specifically, I focus on 
two cross-sectional partitions based on: (1) the level of industry news disseminated by 
the business press, and (2) conditions conducive to intra-industry information transfer. 
First, the effect of media coverage on pricing of industry-wide earnings 
information could depend on the level of common industry news conveyed by media 
coverage. When the business press identifies and reports industry-wide news for related 
firms simultaneously or covers a broad range of related firms, investors may take less 
time or efforts to aggregate and disseminate industry-wide information. Therefore, I 
expect the effect of media coverage on the pricing of industry-wide earnings information 
to be more pronounced when industry-level news coverage is higher.  
Second, I expect that the mitigating effect of annual media coverage on delayed 
reactions to industry-wide earnings should be stronger when intra-industry information 
transfer is easier and faster among firms. This conjecture follows my argument that the 
effect of media coverage on the pricing of industry-wide information is at least partially 
driven by intra-industry information transfers. When firms’ operation is more similar or 
earnings correlation is high, performance comparison and information sharing with other 
firms would be relatively easy.  
Based on the discussion above, I state my second set of hypotheses in alternative 
forms:  




earnings information is stronger when industry-level news coverage is higher.  
H2b: The effect of media coverage on investors’ responses to industry-wide 
earnings information is stronger when intra-industry information transfer is 
easier. 
Notwithstanding the above discussion, whether and to what extent media 
coverage affects investors’ timely responses to industry-wide earnings information is 
ultimately an empirical question. It is likely that when investors’ attention is attracted to 
a specific firm or a set of information, their attention will be distracted from other firms 
or other sets of information. Much of the prior literature on the effect of media coverage 
has documented that broad dissemination of news by the press is associated with a 
strong market reaction to the disclosed firm-specific information (e.g., Bushee et al 
2010; Blankspoor et al. 2018). If media coverage at the firm level drives investor 
attention to firm-specific information and away from broad industry-related information 
then media coverage could exacerbate investors’ underreaction to industry-wide earnings 
because of investors’ limited attention and information processing capacity (Hirshleifer 
et al., 2009; Hirshleifer et al., 2011). Furthermore, understanding the implications of 
firm-specific and industry-wide earnings information may require sophistication and 
expertise. It is possible that investors are not able to efficiently incorporate a broad type 
of news in various formats (qualitative and quantitative) in their valuation of industry-






3.3. Research Design  
3.3.1. The Media as an Information Intermediary 
To test my H1, I build on Hui et al. (2016) and use investors’ underreaction to 
the industry-wide component of earnings to measure investors’ timely responses to 
industry-wide earnings information. I estimate the following OLS regression of post-
announcement abnormal returns: 
𝑆𝐴𝑅 [+2, +61] =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐷_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑉_𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸 × 𝐶𝑂𝑉_𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽4𝐷_𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐷_𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑂𝑉_𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +  ∑ 𝛾𝑘 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 +  𝜀, (3.1) 
where SAR [+2, +61] is the cumulative size-adjusted abnormal return over the sixty-day 
window beginning two days after the earnings announcement date. Industry-wide 
earnings (INDE) are calculated as the average earnings across sample firms in the same 
six-digit GICS industry in a year, representing the common component of the earnings 
of firms in the industry. Hui et al. (2016) document a systematic underreaction to total 
earnings, that is, β1 > 0. In this regression, my variable of interest is annual media 
coverage (COV_ANN). I use media coverage during a fiscal year to match with the 
pricing of annual earnings. I rank the industry-wide earnings into deciles by year and 
then obtain the independent variable (D_INDE) by standardizing this measure to range 
from 0 to 1. If media coverage prompts timely price reactions to industry-wide earnings 
information, then I expect the association between SAR [+2, +61] and D_INDE to 
decline as media coverage increases, that is, β3 < 0.  
For control variables, I include the decile of earnings surprises (D_UE) to control 




variables that can affect the earnings-returns relation and/or media coverage: the decile 
rank of accruals (D_ACCR), firm size (SIZE), loss (LOSS), the book-to-market ratio 
(BM), the earnings-to-price ratio (EP), stock returns over the previous six months 
(MOM), market risk (BETA), analyst coverage (LN_ANALYSTS), institutional ownership 
(INSTOWN), reporting timeliness (LAG), and media coverage over a three-day window 
around the earnings announcement day (COV_EA), Additionally, to further control for 
the determinants of media coverage, I include the amount of firm-initiated material event 
disclosures (8KS_ANN), the number of employees (EMP), an indicator for outstanding 
credit ratings (RATED), and membership in the S&P 500 (SP500). Finally, I include year 
fixed effects to control for time trends and use firm-clustered standard errors to account 
for possible correlation across residuals within the same firm. 
 
3.3.2. Cross-sectional Variations 
The first set of cross-sectional analyses explores the variations in the level of 
industry news coverage (H2a). I construct two measures for industry-wide news 
coverage to capture the intensity of industry news reports and the breadth of media 
coverage. At the firm level, I define a news article as industry-related news if there is at 
least one other news article of the same event type for a different company in the same 
six-digit GICS industry on the same day. I then calculate the percentage of industry news 
articles of all news reports (PERC_INDNEWS) for each firm-year observation.22 This 
                                                 
22 Appendix D provides some examples of news articles classified as industry news using this definition. 




measure is designed to capture the extend of common industry component of each firms’ 
news event that the media identifies and disseminates. At the industry level, I calculate 
the concentration of news coverage (SPREAD_COV) for each industry-year using the 
Herfindahl index of media coverage. This measure is designed to capture the breath of 
media coverage within an industry that arguably affects intra-industry information 
transfers. The intuition underlying these two measures is that industry-related news such 
as regulation changes is more likely to be reflected in the news reports of a group of 
firms in the industry, while a firm-specific event such as CEO retirement should only be 
covered in the news articles for this particular firm.  
Then I partition my sample based on the level of industry-news coverage. If news 
coverage improves investors’ understanding of industry-wide earnings information by 
aggregating and disseminating industry-wide information, then I expect the mitigating 
effects of media coverage on delayed pricing of industry-wide news to be more 
pronounced when industry-wide news coverage is higher (i.e., higher PERC_INDNEWS 
and higher SPREAD_COV). 
The second set of cross-sectional analyses explore the variations in the conditions 
conducive to intra-industry information transfer (H2b). First, I use product similarity as 
one condition that eases information transfer within industries. Specifically, I employ the 
product similarity measure developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2016) and partition my 
                                                 
therefore, this article is categorized as industry-level news. In example D-2, two different companies in the 
same industry are mentioned in two different articles of the same event type on the same day; therefore, 




sample into high and low similarity firms based on their total product similarity scores.23 
Second, I partition my sample into positive comovement and negative comovement 
firms. Freeman and Tse (1992) suggest that the magnitude of information transfer 
depends on the earnings comovement within the industry. Firms within the same 
industry could react differently to industry common forces (e.g., technology shocks). 
The intra-industry information transfer could be easier and faster when a firm’s earnings 
move with industry common forces (i.e., positive comovement) than when a firm’s 
earnings move against its industry common forces (i.e., negative comovement). To 
measure the direction of earnings comovement, I run a time-series regression of 
individual firm’s earnings on the industry total earnings, estimated over the prior eight 
years with a minimum of three years required for inclusion. Then, I partition my sample 
based on the product similarity scores and the direction of earnings movement. I expect 
the mitigating effect of annual media coverage on delayed reactions to industry-wide 
earnings information to be stronger among firms with high product similarity or with 
positive earnings comovement. 
 
3.4. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
3.4.1. Sample Selection 
                                                 
23 Hoberg and Phillips (2016) construct a firm-by-firm pairwise similarity score by comparing the product 
descriptions from firms’ 10-K reports. For any two firms, the product similarity score in the interval [0, 1] 
describes similarities between words used for their product descriptions in their annual reports. Based on 
this textual analysis of product descriptions, the total product similarity measure (TNIC3TSIMM) is the 
sum of pairwise similarity between a firm and its industry peers to describe the total product similarity of a 
firm within its industry. A higher score of TNIC3TSIMM indicates that the text of the firms' business 




I begin my sample selection with the universe of firms listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ markets, with December 31 fiscal year ends24 and with non-
penny common stocks (i.e., stocks with price per share of at least $1.00 at the fiscal year 
end) from 2000 to 2016. I obtain financial data from COMPUSTAT, stock price data 
from CRSP, financial analyst data and management guidance data from I/B/E/S, and 
institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuters. I eliminate financial institutions 
(two-digit GICS code = 40); require each six-digit GICS industry in a year to have at 
least 4 firms in order to calculate industry-wide earnings; and require non-missing data 
for key variables. Following Hui et al. (2016), I use the Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS) as my industry classification scheme because it is consistent from year 
to year and provides a better grouping of firms for capital market-based research 
(Bhojraj et al. 2003). The final sample contains 26,984 firm-year observations. Table E-
1 of Appendix E outlines the sample selection process. 
I obtain news coverage data from the RavenPack Dow Jones Edition 4.0 dataset 
of real-time news coverage from 2000 to 2016. RavenPack provides data analytics for all 
news items disseminated using the Dow Jones Newswire service, which includes the 
Dow Jones Newswires, the Wall Street Journal, Barron’s, and MarketWatch. RavenPack 
classifies a news article into news event categories (such as earnings, product releases, 
and business contracts, etc.) and also assigns a relevance score between 0 and 100 to 
                                                 
24 Consistent with prior studies (Freeman and Tse 1992, Thomas and Zhang 2008, Han et al. 2019), I limit 
my sample to firms with December 31 fiscal year ends to ensure that the announcing firms and non-




indicate how strongly the firm is related to the associated news story. Following Weller 
(2018), I exclude news events on trading or prices (i.e., technical analysis signals, stock 
price movements, order imbalance reports) and announcements of future disclosure dates 
(investor relations items). I merge the RavenPack database with COMPUSTAT/CRSP 
data using RavenPack’s ISIN (or CUSIP) firm identifiers. Appendix B provides 
descriptions of news event types, including industry-wide and firm-specific news, in my 
media coverage sample. Industry-wide news stories constitute about 53% of the total 
news stories in the sample. 
 
3.4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics on the main variables in my 
analyses. Log-transformed annual media coverage, COV_ANN, has a mean value of 
4.03, meaning that the average number of news reports (COUNT_ANN) that firms in my 
sample have during a year is 86.04. Firms in the sample have 45.76 industry-related 
news articles (COUNT_INDNEWS) and 39.29 firm-specific news articles 
(COUNT_FIRMNEWS) during a year. The standard deviation of firm-specific earnings 
(FIRME) is much greater than the standard deviation of industry-wide earnings (INDE), 
consistent with firm-specific profitability being more volatile than industry-wide 
profitability (Hui et al., 2016).25 Sample firms are covered by an average of 11 analysts.  
  
                                                 
25 By construction, the mean of FIRME should be zero. The calculation of industry-wide earnings and 
firm-specific earnings is performed after step 4 of sample selection process (Table E-1 of Appendix E). 




Table 3.1 Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable N MEAN STD P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 
COUNT_ANN 26,984 86.041 80.016 21 42 68 108 163 
COV_ANN 26,984 4.032 1.208 3.091 3.761 4.234 4.691 5.1 
COUNT_EA 26,984 7.423 5.749 2 4 6 9 14 
COV_EA 26,984 1.893 0.76 1.099 1.609 1.946 2.303 2.708 
COUNT_INDNEWS 26,984 45.755 44.591 5 19 36 60 93 
COV_INDNEWS 26,984 3.355 1.221 1.792 2.996 3.611 4.111 4.543 
COUNT_FIRMNEWS 26,984 39.285 50.697 5 14 26 47 82 
COV_FIRMNEWS 26,984 3.145 1.201 1.792 2.708 3.296 3.871 4.419 
PERC_INDNEWS 25,126 0.551 0.208 0.261 0.404 0.568 0.711 0.813 
SPREAD_COV 26,984 -0.028 0.033 -0.058 -0.032 -0.017 -0.012 -0.008 
CAR [+2, +61] 26,984 0.021 0.232 -0.205 -0.091 0.006 0.105 0.242 
SYNCH 26,919 -0.771 1.257 -2.374 -1.536 -0.713 0.075 0.794 
INDE 26,984 0.032 0.099 -0.078 0.015 0.058 0.091 0.11 
FIRME 26,984 0.012 0.131 -0.101 -0.031 0.011 0.068 0.151 
INDCF 26,984 0.0584 0.0828 -0.0273 0.0499 0.0786 0.1046 0.1254 
INDACC 26,984 -0.0260 0.0393 -0.0784 -0.0502 -0.0191 -0.0009 0.0175 
FIRMCF 26,984 0.0091 0.1165 -0.0968 -0.0344 0.0087 0.0621 0.1373 
FIRMACC 26,984 0.0032 0.0681 -0.0725 -0.0276 0.0048 0.0381 0.0779 
UE 26,984 -0.002 0.019 -0.002 0 0 0 0.001 
ACC 26,984 -0.022 0.08 -0.112 -0.056 -0.015 0.018 0.058 
SIZE 26,984 6.979 1.714 4.8 5.77 6.905 8.082 9.277 
BETA 26,984 1.121 0.547 0.457 0.744 1.070 1.440 1.849 
BM 26,984 0.494 0.386 0.119 0.242 0.42 0.649 0.944 
EP 26,984 -0.004 0.162 -0.126 -0.008 0.035 0.059 0.086 
MOM 26,984 0.012 0.188 -0.191 -0.089 0 0.094 0.219 
LOSS 26984 0.273 0.446 0 0 0 1 1 
ROA 26984 0.001 0.164 -0.167 -0.007 0.035 0.075 0.126 
STD_EARN 26984 0.058 0.097 0.004 0.012 0.027 0.063 0.136 
ANALYSTS 26,984 11.137 8.913 2 5 9 15 23 
LN_ANALYSTS 26,984 2.232 0.749 1.099 1.792 2.303 2.773 3.178 
INSTOWN 26,984 0.588 0.308 0 0.373 0.666 0.838 0.944 
LAG 26,984 45.617 15.164 26 33 45 56 67 
8KS_ANN 26,984 11.487 7.624 2 7 11 15 21 
EMP 26,984 11.141 35.433 0.116 0.423 1.876 7.7985 25 
SP500 26,984 0.171 0.376 0 0 0 0 1 




Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Panel B: Pairwise Correlations (asterisks indicate significant at 1% level) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) COV_ANN 1          
(2) PERC_INDNEWS -0.0169* 1         
(3) SPREAD_COV -0.0536* 0.5480* 1        
(4) CAR [+2, +61] -0.0059 -0.0475* -0.0068 1       
(5) SYNCH 0.2339* -0.1005* -0.1023* -0.0123 1      
(6) INDE 0.0502* -0.2924* -0.2205* 0.0726* 0.1472* 1     
(7) FIRME 0.1141* 0.0191* 0.0027 0.0165* 0.1306* -0.0088 1    
(8) SIZE 0.4044* -0.1488* -0.1478* -0.0414* 0.5235* 0.1274* 0.3224*    
(9) BM -0.1297* -0.0870* 0.0035 0.1072* -0.0210* 0.1405* -0.1412* -0.2983* 1  
(10) EP 0.0795* -0.0736* -0.0678* -0.0727* 0.1195* 0.2946* 0.4128* 0.2830* -0.1625* 1 
(11) MOM 0.002 -0.0188* 0.0043 -0.0631* -0.0129 0.0144 -0.0119 0.0176* -0.0402* 0.0092 
(12) LN_ANALYSTS 0.3581* -0.0219* -0.0596* -0.0134 0.3747* 0.0191* 0.2019* 0.7127* -0.1855* 0.0873* 
(13) INSTOWN 0.3098* 0.0573* 0.0033 0.0064 0.2392* 0.0797* 0.1659* 0.2941* -0.0883* 0.1289* 
(14) LAG -0.1616* 0.0756* 0.0748* 0.0235* -0.2725* -0.0782* -0.2335* -0.4436* 0.1090* -0.1312* 
(15) COV_EA 0.7435* -0.1107* -0.0833* 0.0071 0.2163* 0.0921* 0.1382* 0.3837* -0.0975* 0.0901* 
(16) 8KS_ANN 0.2329* -0.0153 0.0190* 0.0006 0.1208* 0.0180* -0.0448* 0.2235* -0.0400* 0.0036 
(17) EMP 0.1980* -0.1932* -0.1859* 0.0028 0.2114* 0.1242* 0.0543* 0.3841* -0.0465* 0.0791* 
(18) SP500 0.2828* -0.2225* -0.1557* 0.0028 0.3399* 0.0894* 0.1478* 0.6487* -0.1008* 0.1180* 
(19) RATED 0.1711* -0.2649* -0.1043* 0.0340* 0.2915* 0.2166* 0.0627* 0.4042* 0.0525* 0.1082* 
(20) UE 0.0465* 0.0012 -0.0074 -0.0325* 0.0253* -0.0044 0.0939* 0.1122* -0.1433* 0.2768* 
            
            
  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
(11) MOM 1          
(12) LN_ANALYSTS -0.0032 1         
(13) INSTOWN -0.0071 0.3064* 1        
(14) LAG -0.0619* -0.3925* -0.1846* 1       
(15) COV_EA 0.0077 0.3514* 0.3079* -0.2091*       
(16) 8KS_ANN -0.0067 0.1737* 0.1594* 0.1195* 0.1313* 1     
(17) EMP 0.0132 0.2663* 0.0597* -0.2112* 0.2230* 0.0611* 1    
(18) SP500 0.0205* 0.4843* 0.1340* -0.3391* 0.3336* 0.1088* 0.3773* 1   
(19) RATED 0.0415* 0.2953* 0.1016* -0.2337* 0.1961* 0.0905* 0.1885* 0.3705* 1  
(20) UE 0.0358* 0.0696* 0.0649* -0.0779* 0.0441* 0.0032 0.0199* 0.0326* 0.0175* 1 
77 
 
Panel B of Table 3.1 provides pairwise correlations among the main variables 
used in my analyses. As expected, media coverage is positively correlated with firm size 
(SIZE), analyst following (LN_ANALYST), and institutional ownership (INSTOWN). The 
correlation coefficient between post announcement abnormal returns (CAR [+2, +61]) 
and industry-wide earnings (INDE) is positive and significant. To reduce the possibility 
that my inferences are influenced by extreme observations, I winsorize all continuous 
variables (except for stock returns) at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their distributions. 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
3.5. Main Empirical Results  
3.5.1. Investors’ Responses to Industry-wide Earnings Information  
Table 3.2 presents the results for the relation between media coverage and 
investors’ responses to industry-wide earnings. I decompose total earnings into industry-
wide earnings and firm-specific earnings. I rank the industry-wide and firm-specific 
earnings into deciles by year and then standardize to get the independent variable 
(D_INDE and D_FIRME), which is indexed from 0 to 1. Column (1) shows that the 
coefficient on the decile of industry-wide earnings (D_INDE) is positive and significant 
(β = 0.054, p-value < 0.01), while the coefficient on the decile of firm-specific earnings 
(D_FIRME) is insignificant. This suggests that the industry-wide earnings component 
predicts future positive stock returns, consistent with prior studies (Hui et al. 2016; 





Table 3.2 The Timeliness of Investors’ Responses to Industry-wide Earnings 
Information (H1)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CAR [+2, +61] CAR [+2, +61] CAR [+2, +61] CAR [+2, +61]      
D_INDE 0.054*** 0.117*** 0.115*** 0.084***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) 
D_FIRME 0.002 
   
 
(0.679) 
   
COV_ANN 
 
0.007*** 0.017*** 0.019***   
(0.004) (0.000) (0.001) 
D_INDE * COV_ANN 
 
-0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016**   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.019) 
D_UE 
  
0.067*** 0.077***    
(0.001) (0.000) 
D_UE * COV_ANN 
  




























































0.013*** -0.006    
(0.001) (0.309) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect No No No Yes 
Observations 26,984 26,984 26,984 26,984 





Following Zhang (2008), the coefficient on D_INDE can be readily interpreted as 
the size-adjusted abnormal return one can earn over the sixty trading days after earnings 
announcements with a zero-investment portfolio strategy that takes a long position in the 
highest decile and a short position in the lowest decile. The coefficient on D_INDE 
suggests that one can earn about 5.4% abnormal returns in the drift window with a zero-
investment portfolio. In Column (2), I examine whether annual media coverage mitigates 
this underreaction to industry-wide earnings. The interaction term between 
D_INDE*COV_ANN is significantly negative, suggesting that media coverage has a 
significant mitigating effect on the magnitude of the drift. In Column (3), I report the 
estimation result of equation (3.1) with an array of control variables. The coefficient on 
the interaction term D_INDE*COV_ANN continues to be significantly negative, 
indicating the robustness of the effect of pre-announcement media coverage on the 
pricing of industry-wide earnings. In Column (4), I include firm fixed effects to 
eliminate the effect of time-invariant firm characteristics and find my results are robust. 
These results provide supporting evidence for my first hypothesis that the overall media 
coverage facilitates the pricing of industry-wide earnings information. 
 
3.5.2. Cross-sectional Variation  
In this section, I perform two set of cross-sectional analyses based on the 
situations in which the effect of media coverage on aggregating and disseminating 
industry-wide news can be different.  




coverage (H2a). To disaggregate the sample with respect to the level of industry-related 
news coverage, I do a median split based on the percentage of industry news reports 
(PERC_INDNEWS) and the breadth of media coverage within an industry 
(SPREAD_COV). Table 3.3 reports the regression results of equation (3.1) using the four 
subsamples. It shows that the effects of media coverage on delayed price reactions to 
industry-wide earnings are quite different across the two subsamples. The significant and 
negative relation between annual media coverage and delayed pricing of industry-wide 
earnings only exists for firms with high percentages of industry news reports (β = -0.023, 
p-value < 0.10). Similarly, the coefficient on the interaction term D_INDE*COV_ANN is 
only significant for firms in industries that are widely covered by the media (β = -0.023, 
p-value < 0.01). The differences in coefficients on the interaction terms are significant 
(p-value < 0.10 or better) across the subsamples. These results suggest the mitigating 
effects of media coverage on delayed pricing of industry-wide earnings information to 
be more pronounced when industry-level news coverage is higher, supporting my 
prediction in H2a.  
Next, I perform cross-sectional analyses based on the conditions that are 
conducive to intra-industry information transfer (H2b). I expect the mitigating effects of 
annual media coverage on delayed reactions to industry-wide earnings to be stronger 
among firms in which performance comparison and information sharing with other firms 
is relatively easy. To test this conjecture, I partition my sample based on the level of 
Hoberg and Phillips (2016)’s product similarity scores and the signs of earnings 




effects of media coverage on delayed price reactions to industry-wide earnings are quite 
different across the subsamples. 
Panel A of Table 3.4 presents the results regarding the effect of product 
similarity on the relation between media coverage and the pricing of industry-wide 
earnings. Columns (1) and (2) report the baseline regressions. While the coefficient on 
D_INDE*COV_ANN is highly significant for firms with high product similarity, it is 
only marginally significant for firms with low product similarity. Column (3) to Column 
(6) examine whether the effect of industry-level news coverage is more pronounced 
when product similarity is high. In Columns (3) and (5), the joint effect of annual media 
coverage and industry-wide news coverage (β3 + β7) is significant at the 1% level, 
indicating that the negative association between media coverage and delayed pricing of 
industry-wide news is significantly stronger for firms with high industry-news coverage. 
Moreover, this joint effect is not significant when the product similarity is low.  
Panel B of of Table 3.4 presents the results regarding the effect of earnings 
comovement on the relation between media coverage and pricing of industry-wide 
earnings. Similar to Panel A, I find that the mitigating effect of media coverage on 
investors’ underreaction to industry-wide news is highly significant when the earnings 
comovement is positive. However, the coefficient on D_INDE*COV_ANN is 
insignificant when earnings comovement is negative. Columns (3) and (5) show that the 
joint effect of annual media coverage and industry-wide news coverage (β3 + β7) is only 
significantly negative when the earnings comovement is positive. Moreover, columns (4) 




is negative. Taken together, the results from this table suggest that the mitigating effect 
of annual media coverage on investors’ underreaction to industry-wide earnings is 
stronger when intra-industry information transfer is relatively easy and fast, consistent 
with my prediction in H2b. 
 
Table 3.3 Cross-sectional Variation - the Effect of Industry News Coverage (H2a)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Low % of 
 Industry News 
High % of 





VARIABLES CAR [+2, +61] CAR [+2, +61] CAR [+2, +61] CAR [+2, +61] 
  
    
D_INDE 0.035 0.138*** 0.085*** 0.144***  
(0.441) (0.009) (0.001) (0.000) 
COV_ANN 0.007 0.014 0.010 0.023***  
(0.543) (0.231) (0.105) (0.000) 
D_INDE * COV_ANN 0.002 -0.023* -0.007 -0.023***  
(0.851) (0.061) (0.224) (0.000) 
D_UE 0.074 0.121** 0.050* 0.079***  
(0.154) (0.033) (0.073) (0.002) 
D_UE * COV_ANN -0.018 -0.030** -0.013** -0.021***  
(0.117) (0.024) (0.044) (0.001)      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes      
Constant 0.053 -0.105** 0.017 -0.112***  
(0.288) (0.044) (0.592) (0.000)      
Observations 12,660 12,466 13,124 13,860 
R-squared 0.047 0.039 0.026 0.047      
Test of difference in 










Table 3.4 Cross-sectional Variations - Conditions for Intra-industry Information Transfer (H2b) 
Panel A: Subsamples Defined Based on Product Similarity 
    High Low High Low High Low 
similarity similarity similarity similarity similarity similarity 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
 
SAR [+2, +61] SAR [+2, +61] SAR [+2, +61] SAR [+2, +61] SAR [+2, +61] SAR [+2, +61] 
    
      
COV_ANN β1 0.006 0.011** -0.028*** -0.004 -0.007 0.011   
(0.131) (0.034) (0.007) (0.725) (0.207) (0.137) 
D_INDE β2 0.128*** 0.105*** 0.023 0.025 0.065* 0.106***   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.760) (0.690) (0.094) (0.009) 
COV_ANN*D_INDE β3 -0.022*** -0.011* -0.003 0.006 -0.005 -0.011   
(0.001) (0.099) (0.865) (0.662) (0.572) (0.237) 
HIGH_INDNEWS β4 
  
-0.144** -0.006 -0.068** 0.005     
(0.019) (0.930) (0.028) (0.910) 
COV_ANN* HIGH_INDNEWS β5 
  
0.030** -0.003 0.020*** 0.000     
(0.023) (0.861) (0.004) (0.976) 
D_INDE*HIGH_INDNEWS β6 
  
0.250** -0.034 0.098* -0.002     
(0.018) (0.733) (0.079) (0.970) 
COV_ANN*D_INDE β7 
  
-0.049** 0.012 -0.026** 0.001 
*HIGH_INDNEWS 
   
(0.033) (0.589) (0.039) (0.913)         
Controls  
   
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect 
   
Yes Yes Yes Yes         
Observations 
 
12,570 12,578 11,646 11,681 12,570 12,578 
R-squared 
 
0.049 0.040 0.053 0.047 0.050 0.040 
HIGH_INDNEWS = 1 
   
if PERC_INDNEWS 
is higher than sample medium 
if SPREAD_COV 
is higher than sample medium 
COV_ANN*D_INDE + COV_ANN*D_INDE 
*HIGH_INDNEWS 
β3 + β7 
      
F-statistic 
   
9.60 0.98 10.98 0.90 
P-value   
  
0.002 0.322 0.001 0.343 
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Table 3.4 (Continued) 
Panel B: Subsamples Defined by Direction of Earnings Comovement   
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative 
comovement comovement comovement comovement comovement comovement   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
 
SAR [+2, +61] SAR [+2, +61] SAR [+2, +61] SAR [+2, +61] SAR [+2, +61] SAR [+2, +61]         
COV_ANN β1 0.008** 0.009 -0.012 -0.015 -0.001 0.006   
(0.036) (0.131) (0.174) (0.237) (0.876) (0.422) 
D_INDE β2 0.132*** 0.082** 0.053 -0.035 0.083** 0.085*   
(0.000) (0.030) (0.332) (0.667) (0.012) (0.091) 
COV_ANN*D_INDE β3 -0.018*** -0.013 -0.002 0.012 -0.007 -0.009   
(0.000) (0.113) (0.846) (0.491) (0.347) (0.403) 
HIGH_INDNEWS β4 
  
-0.088* -0.094 -0.061** 0.012     
(0.094) (0.242) (0.033) (0.795) 
COV_ANN* HIGH_INDNEWS β5 
  
0.017 0.021 0.014** 0.004     
(0.151) (0.241) (0.025) (0.672) 
D_INDE*HIGH_INDNEWS β6 
  
0.133* 0.081 0.087* 0.002     
(0.097) (0.536) (0.054) (0.975) 
COV_ANN*D_INDE β7 
  
-0.026 -0.017 -0.018* -0.008 
*HIGH_INDNEWS 
   
(0.144) (0.561) (0.077) (0.637)         
Controls 
   
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect 
   
Yes Yes Yes Yes         
Observations 
 
20,095 6,889 18,754 6,372 20,095 6,889 
R-squared 
 
0.041 0.021 0.044 0.023 0.041 0.023 
HIGH_INDNEWS = 1 
   
if PERC_INDNEWS if SPREAD_COV 




β3 + β7 
      
F-statistic 
   
4.41 0.05 11.54 1.87 
P-value 
   
0.036 0.828 0.001 0.172 
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Overall, the cross-sectional analyses show that the effect of media coverage on 
the pricing of industry-wide earnings information varies predictably with the 
characteristics of media coverage and conditions for intra-industry information transfer. 
This evidence helps to strengthen my conclusion that the media facilitates the diffusion 
of industry-wide earnings information and improves intra-industry information transfers. 
 
3.6. Additional Analyses 
3.6.1. Price Synchronicity  
This section explores an alternative measure of pricing of industry-wide 
information, stock return synchronicity, which captures the relative amount of firms-
specific, industry-level, and market-level information impounded into stock prices. 
Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) find a positive association between analyst forecasting 
activity and stock return synchronicity, and argue that analysts increase the amount of 
industry-level information in stock prices. I predict that industry-level news coverage 
improves intra-industry information transfers, leading to more synchronous price 
movements among firms in the industry. I examine the relation between industry-level 
news coverage and return synchronicity using the following OLS regression:  
𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐶_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑁𝐸𝑊𝑆𝑖𝑡(𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷_𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡) + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +
 ∑ 𝛾𝑘 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸 +  𝜀,      (3.2) 
I follow Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) to construct price synchronicity by 
regressing weekly returns on the current and the prior week’s value-weighted market 




firm-year observation (see detailed definition in Appendix A). Return synchronicity 
(SYNCH) is measured as the log transformation of R2 estimated from the yearly 
regression. High values of SYNCH indicate stock returns incorporate more industry-wide 
information. Following prior literature (e.g., Piotroski and Roulstone 2004; Crawford et 
al. 2012; Ye et al. 2018), I include the following control variables that are associated 
with stock return synchronicity: firm size (SIZE), the book-to-market ratio (BM), 
profitability (ROA and LOSS), the earning to price ratio (EP), momentum (MOM), 
analyst coverage (LN_ANALYSTS), institutional ownership (INSTOWN), and earnings 
volatility (STD_EARN). Additionally, I include the amount of firm-initiated material 
event disclosures (8KS_ANN), the number of employees (EMP), an indicator for 
outstanding credit ratings (RATED), and membership in the S&P 500 (SP500) to further 
control for the determinants of media coverage. Finally, I include year and industry fixed 
effects, and use firm-clustered standard errors.  
Table 3.5 presents the regression results. As the first step, I confirm the joint 
effect of the intensity of industry-level press coverage (COV_INDNEWS) and firm-
specific press coverage (COV_FIRMNEWS) on return synchronicity in column (1). As 
expected, the coefficient on COV_INDNEWS is positive and significant, while the 
coefficient on COV_FIRMNEWS is negative and significant, suggesting that industry-
level (firm-specific) media coverage helps investors to incorporate relatively more 





Table 3.5 Price Synchronicity  
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES SYNCH SYNCH SYNCH 
        
COV_INDNEWS 0.036***   
 (0.002)   
COV_FIRMNEWS -0.044***   
 (0.000)   
PERC_INDNEWS  0.274***  
  (0.000)  
SPREAD_COV   1.832** 
   (0.018) 
SIZE 0.385*** 0.390*** 0.382*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BM 0.154*** 0.164*** 0.150*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -0.229*** -0.211*** -0.230*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
LOSS 0.009 0.018 0.004 
 (0.666) (0.397) (0.825) 
EP -0.089 -0.072 -0.085 
 (0.109) (0.218) (0.127) 
MOM -0.191*** -0.165*** -0.194*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LN_ANALYSTS 0.037** 0.029* 0.039** 
 (0.028) (0.097) (0.022) 
INSTOWN 0.243*** 0.233*** 0.245*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
STD_EARN 0.366*** 0.370*** 0.361*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
8KS_ANN -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EMP 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
SP500 -0.067** -0.068** -0.075** 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.024) 
RATED 0.029 0.028 0.023 
 (0.199) (0.229) (0.299)     
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes     
Constant -3.477*** -3.528*** -3.429*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Observations 26,919 26,919 26,919 
R-squared 0.455 0.455 0.455 
 
Columns (2) and (3) report the results of estimating equation (3.2). In column 




industry-level news in total news coverage. The coefficient on PERC_INDNEWS is 
positive and significant (p-value < 0.01), suggesting that high percentage of industry-
level press coverage facilitates the pricing of industry-wide information. In column (3), 
my variable of interest is wide-spread media coverage within an industry, 
SPREAD_COV. The negative and significant coefficient on SPREAD_COV (p-value < 
0.01) suggests that firms in industries that are widely covered by the business press have 
more industry-wide information incorporated into their stock prices. 
 
3.6.2. Media Coverage and Intra-industry Information Transfer 
Prior research documents the intra-industry information transfers arising from 
earning announcements. The underlying premise is that one firm’s earnings 
announcement conveys information that is useful for investors to assess peer firms’ 
market value, leading to a revision in the stock prices of peer firms (e.g., Han and Wild 
1990; Freeman and Tse 1992; Thomas and Zhang 2008). So far, I have shown that 
annual media coverage increases the amount of industry-wide information incorporated 
into stock prices, and annual media coverage mitigates the delayed pricing of industry-
wide earnings information. To corroborate my main findings, I test whether announcing 
firms’ annual press coverage affect peer firms’ market reactions to announcing firm’s 
earnings announcements. Firms’ pre-announcement information production and 
dissemination is inversely related to the information content of earnings announcement 
(e.g., Atiase 1985; Beaver et al. 2018). Following a similar argument, if an announcing 




information for all firms within the same industry prior to earnings announcements, then 
announcing firms’ earnings announcements will contain less new information for its peer 
firms.  
I examine whether intra-industry information transfers from earnings 
announcements is related to the announcing firms’ pre-announcement media coverage 
using the following OLS regression:  
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑅[−1, +1] 𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑉_𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽1𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 × 𝐶𝑂𝑉_𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑡 +
∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 +  ∑ 𝛾𝑘 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸 +  𝜀.   (3.3) 
The dependent variable is the non-announcing firms’ average abnormal returns 
within the three-day window (PEERCAR [-1, +1]) around the announcers’ earnings 
announcements. A positive coefficient (β1) on announcing firms’ earnings surprises (UE) 
indicates a positive information transfer from earnings announcements. My variable of 
interest is the interaction term between annual media coverage and earnings surprises. If 
annual media coverage increases the diffusion of industry-wide information prior to 
earnings announcements, then one firm’s earnings announcement will convey less useful 
new information to its peers, that is, β3 <0. Control variables include firm size (SIZE), 
loss (LOSS), the book-to-market ratio (BM), the earning to price ratio (EP), momentum 
(MOM), market risk (BETA), leverage (LEV), analyst coverage (LN_ANALYSTS), 
institutional ownership (INSTOWN), reporting lag (LAG), media coverage around 
earnings announcement (COV_EA), the amount of firm-initiated material event 
disclosures (8KS_ANN), the number of employees (EMP), an indicator for outstanding 




and industry fixed effects, and use firm-clustered standard errors. 
Table 3.6 reports the analyses of intra-industry information transfers. First, I 
gather a different group of announcing firms by identifying the earnings announcements 
of the five largest firms by total assets in each firm-year. Then, I use stock returns from 
all same-industry non-announcing firms, regardless of whether the non-announcing 
firms has already announced earnings. The rationale underlying this test is that large 
firms are more likely to convey industry-wide news relevant to their industry peers 
(Asthana and Mishra 2001; Kovacs 2016). I require that the announcing and non-
announcing firms’ earnings announcement dates are not within 5 trading days from each 
other, in order to avoid confounding information transfers. In column (1), the significant 
and positive coefficient on UE verifies that my sample exhibits intra-industry 
information transfer around earnings announcements. In columns (2) – (4), the 
coefficient on UE*COV_ANN is negative and significant, suggesting that non-
announcing industry peers gain less new industry information from announcing firms’ 
earnings announcements. Column (2) reports the regression results of equation (3.3) and 
column (4) includes firm-fixed effects. This result is robust to controlling for a set of 
firm characteristics, year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and firm fixed effects. 
Taken together, the analyses in Section 6.1. and Section 6.2. provide additional 
supporting evidence that press coverage facilities the diffusion of industry-wide 
information, increases the relative amount of industry-wide information in stock prices, 
and improves intra-industry information transfers. 
Table 3.6 Intra-industry Information Transfer   




VARIABLES PEERCAR [-1, +1] PEERCAR [-1, +1] PEERCAR [-1, +1] PEERCAR [-1, +1]      
UE 0.096* 0.116*** 0.115*** 0.133*** 
 (0.060) (0.007) (0.001) (0.000) 
COV_ANN  -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
  (0.554) (0.407) (0.412) 
UE*COV_ANN  -0.063*** -0.067*** -0.080*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE   -0.001* -0.000 
   (0.056) (0.689) 
LOSS   -0.002 -0.001 
   (0.152) (0.430) 
BM   -0.001 -0.002 
   (0.219) (0.224) 
EP   -0.000 0.001 
   (0.910) (0.725) 
MOM   -0.002 -0.003 
   (0.475) (0.264) 
BETA   -0.003*** -0.004*** 
   (0.001) (0.000) 
LN_ANALYSTS   -0.001 0.002 
   (0.469) (0.288) 
INSTWON   0.000 -0.000 
   (0.810) (0.672) 
LAG   0.001 0.001 
   (0.212) (0.310) 
COV_EA   -0.000 0.000 
   (0.490) (0.904) 
8KS_ANN   -0.000 -0.000 
   (0.870) (0.860) 
EMP   0.000 0.001 
   (0.957) (0.711) 
SP500   -0.000 0.001 
   (0.975) (0.494) 
RATED   0.001 0.000 
   (0.411) (0.757) 
Year fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effect No Yes Yes No 
Firm fixed effect No No No Yes 
Constant 0.000 0.014*** 0.023*** 0.012 
 (0.535) (0.000) (0.000) (0.165)      
Observations 4,761 4,761 4,761 4,761 




3.6.3. Information Dissemination or Information Generation 




press diffuses industry-wide earnings-related information by examining its information 
dissemination role and information generation role. Specifically, I decompose the total 
media coverage into full articles and other newswire articles (i.e., news flashes, tabular 
material and press releases distributed by Dow Jones). News flashes typically just 
rebroadcast company-initiated disclosures, while full articles usually include additional 
editorial content. Similar to Drake et al. (2014) and Bonsall et al. (2018b), I use the 
number of newswire reports as a proxy for the level of information dissemination and 
the number of full articles as a proxy for the level of information generation. Table 3.7 
presents the estimation results for equation (1), after replacing total annual media 
coverage (COV_ANN) with full article coverage (COV_ANN_FULL) and newswire 
coverage (COV_ANN_WIRE). In columns (1) – (2), I find that the level of information 
generation (COV_ANN_FULL) and the level of information dissemination 
(COV_ANN_WIRE) both improve investors’ timely responses to industry-wide earnings 
information. In column (3), the coefficient on information generation is no longer 
significant, while the coefficient on information dissemination remains significant and 
negative. It seems that the faster diffusion of industry-wide information arises mainly 
from benefits of wide dissemination of business news, rather than the supplemental 
information the business press provides to the market.26 
Table 3.7 Information Dissemination or Information Generation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
                                                 
26 The correlation coefficient between COV_ANN_FULL and COV_ANN_WIRE are 0.664 and significant 
at 1% level. It seems that the media tends to report news events in various formats, so the level of full 
articles coverage is highly correlated with the level of newswire coverage. Because of the highly 
significant correlation between information dissemination and information generation, I do not make 




  CAR [+2, +61] CAR [+2, +61] CAR [+2, +61] 
    
D_INDE 0.007*  -0.009*** 
 (0.050)  (0.007) 
COV_ANN_FULL 0.084*** 0.142*** 0.142*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
COV_WIRE  0.022*** 0.029*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
D_INDE * COV_ANN_FULL(β1) -0.008**  0.008 
 (0.034)  (0.116) 
D_INDE*COV_ANN_WIRE (β2)  -0.022*** -0.029*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
D_UE 0.034** 0.066*** 0.065*** 
 (0.014) (0.000) (0.001) 
D_UE * COV_ANN_FULL -0.013***   
 (0.003)   
D_UE*COV_ANN_WIRE  -0.019*** -0.019*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
F-Statistic ( β1 = β2)   11.90 
    
Observations 26,984 26,984 26,984 
R-squared 0.030 0.031 0.031 
 
 
3.6.4. The Pricing of Industry-wide Accruals and Cash flows 
This section examines whether annual media coverage affects the pricing of 
industry-wide accruals and cash flows. Sloan (1996) shows that the market fixates on 
total earnings, and overreacts to the operating accruals component of earnings while 
underreacting to the cash flow component. These inefficient price responses are arguably 
attributable to either the high cost of information acquisition or to investors’ limited 
information processing capacity. Considering both industry fundamentals and 
accounting constructs together, Hui et al. (2016) further decompose the industry-wide 
and firm-specific earnings into industry-wide and firm-specific accruals and cash flows. 




investors’ underreaction to total cash flows is mainly attributable to its industry-wide 
component.  
Prior literature has documented that financial intermediaries help investors better 
understand the implications of accrual and cash flow component of earnings. For 
example, Mohanram (2014) demonstrates that the mispricing of accruals is mitigated 
when financial analysts provide implicit forecasts of future accruals through cash flow 
forecasts. Related to my study, Drake et al. (2014) show that the business press coverage 
of annual earnings announcements alleviates the mispricing of cash flows but not the 
mispricing of accruals. To test the role of media coverage in the pricing of industry-wide 
earnings components, I follow Hui et al. (2016) and decompose industry-wide earnings 
(INDE) into industry-wide accruals (INDACC) and industry-wide cash flows (INDCF), 
then re-estimate equation (1).  
Table 3.8 present the results. Column (1) of Panel A shows a baseline regression. 
The coefficient on the decile rank of industry-wide cash flows is larger than the 
coefficient on the decile rank of industry-wide accruals; this suggests that the industry-
wide cash flows is a stronger predictor of future returns than firm-specific accruals. In 
columns (2) and (3), the coefficients on the interaction terms are both negative and 
significant, suggesting that annual media coverage has mitigating effects on the delayed 
pricing of industry-wide accruals and cash flows. While Drake et al. (2014) show that 
media coverage has negligible effect on the pricing of accruals, my analysis provides 
new evidence that the business press influences investors’ price reactions to both accrual 





Table 3.8 The Pricing of Industry-wide and Firm-specific Accruals and Cash Flows 
Panel A: The Effect of Media Coverage on the Pricing of Industry-wide Accruals 
and Cash Flows  
(1) (2) (2) 
VARIABLES SAR [+2, +61] SAR [+2, +61] SAR [+2, +61] 






D_INDACC 0.026*** 0.063*** 0.069*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 





D_INDCF 0.066*** 0.114*** 0.136*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 








   
(0.000) 
D_UE * COV_ANN 
  
-0.017*** 
   
(0.000) 
    
Controls No No Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 26,984 26,984 26,984 






Table 3.8 (Continued) 
Panel B: The effect of media coverage on the pricing of firm-specific accruals and 
cash flows  
(1) (2) (2) 
VARIABLES SAR [+2, +61] SAR [+2, +61] SAR [+2, +61] 






D_FIRMACC -0.009* -0.002 0.037** 
 
(0.092) (0.890) (0.045) 





D_FIRMCF 0.009* 0.073*** 0.122*** 
 
(0.087) (0.000) (0.000) 








   
(0.003) 
D_UE * COV_ANN 
  
-0.015*** 
   
(0.001) 
    
Controls No No Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 26,984 26,984 26,984 
R-squared 0.021 0.021 0.043 
 
To complete the analysis, in Panel B of Table 3.8, I test the effect of media 
coverage on the pricing of firm-specific accruals and cash flows. In Column (1), the 
negative and significant coefficient on the decile rank of firm-specific accruals provides 
evidence of investors’ overreaction to firm-specific accrual component of earnings. In 
columns (2) and (3), we include interaction terms between annual media coverage and 
firm-specific accruals and cash flows. I find a significant effect of media coverage on the 




of the pricing of firm-specific accruals, consistent with the findings in Drake et al. 
(2014). 
 
3.6.5. Robustness Checks 
A potential concern with most of media studies is the endogenous determinant of 
media coverage, which could be affected by some correlated omitted variables. For 
example, the media could choose to cover firms with more efficient prices. Because 
industry-wide information, by construction, is independent of any specific firm 
information, such endogeneity is less a concern in my study. Furthermore, the cross-
sectional analyses in Section 5.2. also provide consistent evidence on channels through 
which the media coverage facilitates intra-industry information transfers and alleviates 
potential concerns about omitted variables correlated with media coverage that might be 
driving the results. To check the robustness of main results, in this section, I perform 
three robustness checks to address the potential endogeneity problem. 
First, I use two-stage least squares (2SLS) tests with the prior year media 
coverage as an instrumental variable (IV), following Drake et al. (2014) and Ahn et al. 
(2019). Panel A of Table 3.9 reports the results. Because I interact media coverage with 
the decile rank of industry-wide earnings, my estimation method follows the approach 
proposed by Wooldridge (2003) for nonlinear endogenous variables.27 Column (1) 
                                                 
27 The procedure for conducting 2SLS recommended by Wooldridge (2003) with interactions between 
endogenous and exogenous repressors involves one additional step. Specifically, I first regress the annual 
media coverage (COV_ANN) on my IV (COV_ANN_LAG) then predict media coverage 
PRED_COV_ANN. Second, I use PRED_COV_ANN and D_EARN*PRED_COV_ANN as the IVs in the 




reports the initial regression of COV_ANN on my IV (COV_ANN_LAG). Columns (2) 
and (3) report the first stage analyses. The partial F-statistics for the joint significance of 
the instruments suggest that PRED_COV_ANN and D_EARN*PRED_COV_ANN are 
both strong instruments (p-value < 0.01). In column (4), I find that the coefficient for 
D_INDE*COV_ANN is significantly negative, consistent with my main findings 
presented in Table 3.2. 
Next, I perform a matched sample test and change analysis, and report the results 
in Panel B of Table 3.9. To construct the matched sample, I find a matched firm for each 
firm in my sample in the same industry, year, size decile, and decile of firm-initiated 
disclosures (as measured by the number of 8-K filings during the fiscal period), but with 
the largest difference in annual media coverage. Untabulated t-tests show insignificant 
differences in firm size (SIZE) and the level of 8-K disclosures (8KS_ANN) but 
significant differences in annual media coverage (COV_ANN) between matched pairs. 
This procedure produces a sample of 7,840 firm-year observations. I then rerun equation 
(1) using this matched subsample and report the result in column (1). The coefficient on 
D_INDE*COV_ANN is negative and significant, consistent with main results.  
Lastly, I identify 8,628 firm-year observations that experienced significant 
increases in media coverage from year t to year t+1 during my sample period and 
perform a within-sample analysis. Empirically, observations in year t serve as my 
control group while observations in year t+1 serve as my treatment group. I rank the 
                                                 




changes in annual media coverage from year t to t+1 into quartiles 
(RANK_INCREASE_ANN), and consider this the treatment level each firm received in 
year t+1. I then test whether the dependent variables in my main tests are associated with 
the treatment (i.e., increases in media coverage from year t to t+1). The regression result 
is presented in column (2) of Panel B. The significant and negative coefficient on the 
interaction term suggests that increases in annual media coverage are positively 
associated with investors’ timely responses to industry-wide earnings, consistent with 
my main findings earlier.28  
Overall, using instrumental variable test, matched sample test and change 
analysis, I provide robust evidence that media coverage facilitates diffusion of industry-
wide news and mitigates investors’ underreaction to industry-wide earnings information. 
 
  
                                                 
28 The matching and change approaches do not resolve the endogeneity problem per se, to the extent that 
there is an endogenous determinant of media coverage, however, these methods could mitigate some of 




Table 3.9 Robustness Checks 
Panel A: Instrumental Variable Tests  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS First-stage First-stage Second-stage 
VARIABLES COV_ANN COV_ANN 
D_INDE 
*COV_ANN 
CAR [+2, +61] 
     
COV_ANN_LAG 0.287***    
 (0.000)    
PRED_COV_ANN  1.000*** 0.056***  
  (0.000) (0.000)  
D_INDE*PRED_COV_ANN  0.001 1.005***  
  (0.962) (0.000)  
COV_ANN    0.015*** 
    (0.002) 
D_INDE*COV_ANN    -0.028*** 
    (0.000) 
D_INDE -0.137*** -0.003 -0.010 0.175*** 
 (0.000) (0.963) (0.761) (0.000) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 1.297*** 0.001 0.002 -0.079*** 
 (0.000) (0.979) (0.955) (0.000) 
     
Observations 26,984 26,984 26,984 26,984 






Table 3.9 (Continued) 
Panel B: Matched Sample and Change Sample 
  Matched sample Change sample 
 
(1) (2) 
VARIABLES CAR [+2, +61] CAR [+2, +61] 
   
D_INDE 0.153*** 0.098*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 










   
Controls Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect No No 
   
Observations 7,840 8,628 







4.1. Conclusions for essay 1 
This study examines whether media coverage preceding earnings announcements 
affects the information content of earnings announcements, through a direct information 
flow to investors and an indirect information flow through financial analysts. First, I find 
that pre-announcement media coverage improves analysts’ anticipation of earnings and 
stimulates analyst forecast activities. Second, controlling for analyst forecast activities, I 
find that the announcement period price revaluation decreases as pre-announcement 
media coverage increases. This suggests that investors anticipating more of the earnings-
related information prior to the earnings announcements. Lastly, I find that analyst 
forecast activity serves as an important channel through which the pre-announcement 
media coverage preempts the information content in earnings announcements.  
This study contributes to the literature on the role of the media as an essential 
intermediary in capital markets. While it is well documented that financial analysts 
provide earnings forecast information to investors, this study provides initial evidence of 
the role the traditional business press plays in forming earnings expectations. This issue 
is especially relevant given the dramatic shrinkage in the equity research industry in the 
past decade. My study differs from prior literature in three important respects. First, I 
examine a critical but previously unexamined role of the media in price discovery—the 
preempting effect of media coverage on the amount of information contained in 




intermediaries and their joint effect on the pricing of earnings-related information. Third, 
I study the continuous nature of media coverage over a long window, covering a broad 
range of economic events. Bushee et al. (2010) state that “The business press is perhaps 
the broadest and most widely disseminated of all potential information intermediaries.” 
Therefore, understanding how media coverage impacts price discovery is important. 
Collectively, my evidence suggests that the media serves as a valuable information 
source for investors on a continual basis. 
 
4.2. Conclusions for essay 2 
Emerging literature shows that the financial media is a key information 
intermediary in capital markets. While extant studies examining the effect of media 
coverage on price discovery are restricted to the firm-level effect, my study focuses on a 
broader industry-effect and investigates how press coverage during a fiscal year affects 
the pricing of industry-wide earnings information. Using a broad range of business news 
coverage, I find that annual media coverage mitigates investors’ underreaction to 
industry-wide earnings. Furthermore, I find that this mitigating effect is stronger when 
industry-level news coverage is greater or when intra-industry information transfer is 
easier. These results suggest that the media improving the diffusion of industry-wide 
information by aggregating and disseminating common industry information, and 
facilitating intra-industry information transfers. Therefore, the media plays an important 
role in the price discovery of earnings-related information at the industry level.  




intermediary in capital markets. I provide new evidence that the financial media 
facilitates the diffusion of earnings-related information and improves investors’ timely 
responses to earnings-related information at the industry level. This study also 
contributes to the literature on intra-industry information transfer. I document that cross-
sectional variations in the pricing of industry-wide information is associated with the 
level of industry common news disseminated by the media and the conditions conducive 
to intra-industry information transfers. My study has implications for market participants 
and academic researchers who are interested in understanding the role of financial media 
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VARIABLE DEFINITION  
 
Variable Description Source 
8KS_ANN Total number of 8-K disclosures issued during the fiscal 
year. 
DirectEdgar 
8KS_NONREP Total number of 8-K disclosures issued during the 
nonreport period defined as 60 trading days [-61, -2], 
ending two days prior to the earnings announcement date.  
DirectEdgar 
ACCR Total accruals, measured as {Changes in current assets 
(ACT) - changes in cash (CHE)} - {changes in current 
liabilities (LCT) - changes in debt in current liabilities 
(DLC)} - changes in deferred tax liability (TXDITC) - 
depreciation (DP). 
COMPUSTAT 
ACCURACY Analysts' relative forecast accuracy, measured as the 
difference between a particular absolute consensus 
forecast error and the corresponding absolute time-series 
forecast error. The consensus forecast is measured as the 
mean of the most recent financial analysts’ annual EPS 
forecasts issued during the 60 trading days, ending two 
days prior to the earnings announcement date. Absolute 
time-series forecast errors are the seasonal changes of 
earnings per share, scaled by the stock price at the end of 
the fiscal year. 
IBES 
ANALYSTS The number of analysts covering the firm for the fiscal 
year. 
IBES 
BETA Systematic risk estimated from regression of daily raw 
returns on the return to a value-weighted market portfolio 
over a 250-trading-day window preceding the end of the 
fiscal year. 
Regression 
BM Ratio of book value of common equity to market value 
(COMPUSTAT item CEQ/ (COMPUSTAT item 
CSHO*PRCC_F)). 
COMPUSTAT 
CAR [+2, +61] Buy and hold abnormal return calculated as the raw return 
minus the return on the corresponding size decile 
portfolio from CRSP over the sixty-trading day window 
starting two days after the earnings announcement date. 
CRSP 
CF Operating cash flows, calculated as cash flows from 
operating activities (COMPUSTAT item OANCF) minus 
extraordinary items and accrual portion of extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations (COMPUSTAT item 
XIDOC) reported on the statement of cash flows, deflated 
by average total assets (COMPUSTAT item AT).  
COMPUSTAT 
COUNT_ANN The total number of articles during the fiscal year.  RavenPack 
COUNT_EA The total number of articles during the announcement 
period defined as 3 trading day window [-1, +1] around 





COUNT_FIRMNEWS The total number of firm-specific news articles during the 
fiscal year. A news article that is not classified as 
industry-related news is firm-specific news.  
RavenPack 
COUNT_INDNEWS The total number of industry news articles during the 
fiscal year. A news article is defined as industry-related 
news if there is at least one other news article of the same 
event type (such as interest rate, demand guidance, and 
etc.) for a different company in the same six-digit GICS 
industry on the same day. 
RavenPack 
COUNT_NONREP The total number of articles during the nonreport period 
defined as 60 trading days [-61, -2] ending two days prior 
to earnings announcement date.  
RavenPack 
COUNT_NONREP_NA The total number of articles during the nonreport period 
defined as 60 trading days [-61, -2] ending two days prior 
to earnings announcement date, excluding the news 
articles that are directly related to financial analyst 
forecasts. 
RavenPack 
COV_ANN Annual press coverage, measured as the natural logarithm 
of one plus total number of articles (COUNT_ANN) 
during the fiscal year. 
RavenPack 
COV_ANN_LAG Prior year media coverage, which is COV_ANN lagged by 
one year. 
RavenPack 
COV_EA Announcing period press coverage, measured as the 
natural logarithm of one plus total number of articles 
(COUNT_EA) during the announcement period. 
RavenPack 
COV_FIRMNEWS Natural logarithm of one plus total number of firm-
specific news articles (COUNT_FIRMNEWS) during the 
fiscal year. 
RavenPack 
COV_INDNEWS Natural logarithm of one plus total number of industry 
news articles (COUNT_INDNEWS) during the fiscal year. 
RavenPack 
COV_NONREP_LAG Prior year media coverage during the nonreport period, 
which is COV_NONREP lagged by one year. 
RavenPack 
COV_NONREP Media coverage during the nonreport period, measured as 
the natural logarithm of one plus total number of articles 
(COUNT_NONREP) during the nonreport period.  
RavenPack 
COV_NONREP_NA Non-analyst related media coverage during the nonreport 
period, measures as the natural logarithm of one plus total 
number of articles (COUNT_NONREP_NA) unrelated to 
analyst forecasts during the nonreport period. 
RavenPack 
EARN Operating income after depreciation (COMPUSTAT item 
OIADP), deflated by average assets (COMPUSTAT item 
AT).  
COMPUSTAT 
EMP Number of employees (in thousands) at the end of fiscal 
year.  
COMPUSTAT 
EP The ratio of earnings (IB) to market value of equity 
(PRCC_F*CSHO). 
COMPUSTAT 
FIRMACCR Firm-specific accruals, calculated as the difference 
between FIRME and FIRMCF. 
COMPUSTAT 
FIRMCF Firm-specific cash flows, calculated as the differnce 
between CF and INDCF. 
COMPUSTAT 
FIRME Firm-specific earnings, calculated as the difference 





FREQ Analyst forecast frequency is calculated as the average 
number of earnings forecasts that analysts made for a 
particular firm during the non-report period (i.e., sixty 
trading day window ending two days prior to earnings 
announcement date). 
IBES 
INDACCR Industry-wide accruals, calculated as INDE minus 
INDCF. 
COMPUSTAT 
INDCF Industry-wide cash flows, calculated as the average of 
cash flows across sample firms in the same six-digit GICS 
industry in a year, following Hui et al. (2016).  
COMPUSTAT 
INDE Industry-wide earnings calculated as the average Earnings 
(EARN) across sample firms in the same six-digit GICS 
industry in a year, following Hui et al. (2016).  
COMPUSTAT 




LAG The number of days after the end of the fiscal year that 
earnings are announced. 
COMPUSTAT 
LEV Total debt (COMPUSTAT item DLC+DLTT) scaled by 
total assets (COMPUSTAT item AT). 
COMPUSTAT 
LN_ANALYSTS Natural logarithm of the number of analysts covering the 
firm for the fiscal year. 
IBES 
LOSS An indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings before 
extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT item IB) is negative, 
and 0 otherwise. 
COMPUSTAT 
LOSS An indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings before 
extraordinary items (IB) is negative, and 0 otherwise. 
COMPUSTAT 
MF_ALONE An indicator variable for standalone guidance, set to equal 
to 1 if managers issued at least one annual earnings 
guidance prior to an earnings announcement (i.e., from 
one day after prior year earnings announcement to one 
day prior to current year earnings announcement), and 0 
otherwise. 
IBES 
MF_BUNDLE An indicator variable for bundled guidance, set to equal to 
1 if managers issued an annual earnings guidance within 
two days of an earnings announcement [0, +1], and 0 
otherwise. 
IBES 
MOM Cumulative abnormal return as the raw return minus the 
return on the corresponding size decile portfolio from 
CRSP over the sixty-trading day window [-61, -2] ending 
two days prior to the earnings announcement date. 
CRSP 
MVE Market value of equity (COMPUSTAT item 
PRCC_F*CSHO). 
COMPUSTAT 
PEERCAR [-1, +1] The non-announcing firms’ average abnormal returns, 
measured as the raw return minus the return on the 
corresponding size decile portfolio from CRSP, within the 
three-day window around the announcers’ earnings 
announcements. 
CRSP 
PERC_INDNEWS Number of industry news articles divided by total number 
of news articles, and expressed as a percentage.  
RavenPack 
RATED An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company is rated by 






RESP Analyst responsiveness to earnings announcement, 
measured as the number of earnings forecasts that 
analysts made for a particular firm during the 
announcement period (i.e., three trading day window 
around earnings announcement day). 
IBES 
RI Revaluation Index measured as the absolute value of the 
three-day announcement-period abnormal return divided 
by the average of the absolute abnormal returns in 20 
successive three-day periods in the nonreport period. 
Abnormal return is calculated as the raw return minus the 
return on the corresponding size decile portfolio from 
CRSP. Announcement period is defined as three trading 
day window around earnings announcement day and 
nonreport period is defined as sixty trading day window 
ending two days prior to earnings announcement date.  
CRSP 
RI_RAND An alternative measure for revaluation index, measured as 
the absolute value of the three-day announcement-period 
abnormal return divided by the absolute abnormal return 
during a random three-day window in the nonreport 
period.  
CRSP 
RI_U An alternative measure for revaluation index (U-statistic). 
Similar to Landman and Maydew (2012), I calculate the 
squared standardized residual returns as follows: 𝑅𝐼_𝑈 =
 𝜇𝑖𝑡
2̅̅̅̅ /𝜎𝑖
2, where t = -1, 0, +1 relative to announcement day 
0 for firm i. Specifically, I run daily market model-
adjusted returns as 𝜇𝑖𝑡  = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡). Rit is the 
stock return of firm i for day t, and Rmt is the CRSP equal-
weighted return. αi and βi are firm i’s market model 
parameter estimates and 𝜎𝑖
2 is the variance of firm i’s 
market model residuals during the non-event period. The 
non-event period is defined as days t-60 to t-10 and t+10 
to t+60 relative to the earnings announcement date, t=0. 
CRSP 
ROA Return on assets, measured as earnings before 
extraordinary items (IB), deflated by average assets (AT).  
COMPUSTAT 
SIZE Natural logarithm of market value of equity 
(COMPUSTAT item PRCC_F*CSHO). 
COMPUSTAT 
SP500 Membership in the S&P 500 stock index. COMPUSTAT 
SPREAD_COV Negative 1 time the Herfindahl index (H-index) of media 
coverage. H-index is calculated as the sum of squares of 
the shares of media coverage based on the number of 
articles of all companies in the same six-digit GICS 
industry for each year. An industry with higher value 
indicates a more widely covered industry.  
RavenPack 
STD_EARN The standard deviation of earnings (IB) measured over the 
last five years, scaled by assets (AT). At least three years 
of data is required.  
COMPUSTAT 
SYNCH Stock return synchronicity, measured as log [R2/(1-R2)], 
where R2 is estimated from the following model, 
following Piotroski and Roulstone (2004): RETi,t = α + β1 
MARETi,t-1 + β2 MARETi,t +  β3 INDRETi,t-1 + β4 INDRETi,t 
+ε. RETi,t is firm i's week t return, MARETi,t-1 and 





market return from CRSP. INDRETi,t is the value-
weighted average return of all firms within the same 
industry for week t, with firm i's weekly return omitted. 
INDRETi,t-1 is the prior week value weighted industry 
return.  
UE Unexpected earnings measured as the actual earnings per 
share as reported by IBES minus the mean of most recent 
individual analyst forecasts, scaled by the stock price at 























Earnings Earnings  108,892 201,924 310,816 12.17% 
Earnings Earnings per share  63,093 119,467 182,560 7.15% 
Earnings EPS-guidance/ Earnings-
guidance 
62,748 38,883 101,631 3.98% 
Earnings Operating earnings, EBITA, 
etc. 
16,563 3,312 19,875 0.78% 
    251,296 363,586 614,882 24.07% 
Insider Trading Insider sell 43,477 221,788 265,265 10.38% 
Insider Trading Sell registration 36,524 190,490 227,014 8.89% 
Insider Trading Insider buy 42,324 87,305 129,629 5.07% 
Insider Trading Gift, Surrender, Lawsuits 60,393 46,524 106,917 4.19% 
    182,718 546,107 728,825 28.53% 
Revenues Revenues, Revenue 
guidance, Sale, etc. 
107,909 134,965 242,874 9.51% 
Products 
services 
Business contract, Product 
release, Clinical trials, 
Award, etc. 
109,349 93,722 203,071 7.95% 
Labor issues Executive appointment, 
Resignation, etc. 
101,734 59,246 160,980 6.30% 
Acquisitions Acquisition, Merger, Stake, 
etc. 
88,489 24,256 112,745 4.41% 
Analyst ratings Analyst ratings changes, Set, 
History 
51,723 56,666 108,389 4.24% 
Equity actions Trading, IPOs, Buybacks, 
etc. 
83,280 17,904 101,184 3.96% 
Credit ratings Credit rating changes, Credit 
watch 
57,757 6,896 64,653 2.53% 
Dividends Dividends, Guidance, etc. 36,218 16,695 52,913 2.07% 
Marketing Campaign, Conference, etc. 17,054 22,193 39,247 1.54% 
Credit Note sale, Debt, Loan, etc. 31,025 3,325 34,350 1.34% 
Assets Facility, Asset, Patent, etc. 26,755 2,370 29,125 1.14% 
Partnerships Partnership, Joint venture, 
etc. 
19,960 7,971 27,931 1.09% 
Legal Settlement, Verdicts, 
Lawsuits, etc. 
21,475 1,634 23,109 0.90% 
Others Bankruptcy, Accidents, etc. 9,081 964 10,045 0.39% 
  






EXAMPLES OF NEWS TYPES 
 
This appendix contains different news formats in my sample. Full articles 
constitute 37.68% of my sample, news flashes constitute 39.96% of my sample, press 
releases constitute 18.72% of my sample, and tabular material constitute 3.64% of my 
sample.  
 






















EXAMPLES OF INDUSTRY-LEVEL NEWS STORIES 
 
This Appendix contains examples of industry-level news reports. There are two 
types of industry-level news articles using my definition in Chapter 2. First, multiple 
companies in the same industry are mentioned in one news article. The second one is 
when two or more companies in the same industry are mentioned in different articles 
about the same type of events (e.g., revenues, product releases, market shares) on the 
same day. 
 
D-1 Earnings (One article mentioning multiple companies on the same day) 
 
 

















Table E-1: Sample selection 
(1) NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ observations from 2000 to 2016  




(2)      Financial institutions (two-digit GICS code = 40) (12,190) 
(3)      Firm-year observations without stock prices (3,926) 
(4)      Firm-year observations in an industry with less than 4 firms in a year  (97) 
(5)      Firm-year observations without sufficient COMPUSTAT data (2,114) 
(6)      Firm-year observations without analyst forecasts (4,167) 
(7)      Days between an earnings announcement and fiscal year-end greater  







Table E-2: Sample distribution by year 
Year Number of Firms % of Sample   Year Number of Firms % of Sample 
2000 1,449 5.37   2009 1,596 5.92 
2001 1,484 5.50   2010 1,579 5.85 
2002 1,463 5.42   2011 1,572 5.82 
2003 1,498 5.55   2012 1,583 5.87 
2004 1,567 5.81   2013 1,595 5.91 
2005 1,604 5.94   2014 1,691 6.27 
2006 1,614 5.98   2015 1,747 6.48 
2007 1,642 6.08   2016 1,723 6.38 






Table E-3: Industry composition 









1010 Energy 352 2,558 9.48% 8.01% 
1510 Materials 171 1,591 5.90% 5.26% 
2010 Capital Goods 279 2,443 9.05% 9.19% 
2020 Commercial Services & 
Supplies 
125 1,088 4.03% 3.93% 
2030 Transportation 74 722 2.68% 1.87% 
2510 Automobiles & Components 39 327 1.21% 1.15% 
2520 Consumer Durables & 
Apparel 
106 933 3.46% 3.74% 
2530 Consumer Services 161 1,150 4.26% 4.27% 
2540 Media 103 734 2.72% 2.72% 
2550 Retailing 85 670 2.48% 4.71% 
3010 Food & Staples Retailing 17 116 0.43% 0.93% 
3020 Food Beverage & Tobacco 65 529 1.96% 2.57% 
3030 Household & Personal 
Products 
21 190 0.70% 1.14% 
3510 Health Care Equipment & 
Services 
346 2,513 9.31% 8.80% 
3520 Pharmaceuticals, 
Biotechnology & Life 
Sciences 
435 2,558 9.48% 10.23% 
4510 Software & Services 490 2,848 10.55% 10.82% 
4520 Technology Hardware & 
Equipment 
206 1,615 5.99% 7.93% 
4530 Semiconductors & 
Semiconductor Equipment 
105 1,007 3.73% 3.66% 
5010 Telecommunication Services 86 506 1.88% 1.61% 
5510 Utilities 100 1,207 4.47% 2.90% 
6010 Real Estate 185 1,679 6.22% 4.55% 
    
 
26,984 100.00% 100.00% 
 
 
